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DUE PROCESS: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND THE STIGMA OF SEXUAL ABUSE
ALLEGATIONS IN CHILD CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
There is growing public awareness of the victimization of
children at the hands of their parents. Political pressure,1 media
coverage,2 and a litigious populace3 have increased the demand
for accountability from those charged with the investigation and
prosecution of sex offenses against children.! Public outcry over
the proliferation of child abuse has sparked a flurry of federal
and state legislation.5 This attention is justified and necessary
' See HHS Releases New Data Showing High Level of Child Abuse, Neglect
Cases, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NEWS/CURNWS File, (quoting Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Sha-
lala: "Child abuse and neglect continue to be a shameful tragedy in our country, and
every one of us has a stake in preventing it .... and our shock must move us to ac-
tion.").
2 See LELA B. COSTIN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA 18-19
(1996). The authors discuss sexual child abuse as a form of entertainment fodder for
talk show hosts, sensational celebrity cases, and the media's focus on high-visibility
trials. See id. The media thereby deflects attention from the most vulnerable vic-
tims, trivializing the problem. See id. at 40.
3 See A.B.A. CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, LIABILITY IN CHILD WELFARE
AND PROTECTION WORK: RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 14 (Marcia Sprague &
Robert M. Horowitz eds., 1991) (discussing frequent litigation under federal civil
rights laws concerning wrongful removal of children from parental custody and
qualified immunity protection afforded social service workers).
' See generally id. (discussing child protection agencies' dilemma in evaluating
cases when intervention is required and yet workers must minimize the potential
for litigation charging erroneous intervention); see also Gail Vida Hamburg, When
Parents Fail, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 1997, at 1 (discussing climate of hysteria which has
had the unfortunate effect of over-intervention); Susan Freinkel, Aggressive Coun-
sel, Unpopular Cause, RECORDER, July 23, 1992, (describing a law practice built on
representing accused child abusers in an atmosphere compared to Salem during the
witch trials).
6 See COSTIN, supra note Z at 126-29. Federal initiatives include the Child
Abuse and Prevention Act of 1974, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. See id. By the time Presi-
dent Clinton took office, federal action was urgently needed. See id. at 127. In spite
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for the protection of children's rights. The rights of the parents,
however, are often trivialized by inadequate procedures that iail
to safeguard them from the potentially catastrophic effects of
sexual abuse allegations.7
States are facing a frightening surge in reported cases of
child abuse.' Specifically, there has been a dramatic increase in
cases involving parents accused of sexually abusing their chil-
dren.' In its role as parens patriae, ° the state is empowered to
of projections that federal spending for foster care would climb 61%, from
$2,423,000 in 1993 to $3,913,000 in 1998, there was no evidence that child welfare
conditions were improving. See id. The Children's Defense Fund estimated that the
number of children reported to be abused or neglected in 1992 had tripled since
1980. See id. State budgets were similarly burdened. See id. Child welfare research-
ers Edith Fein and Anthony Maluccio observed that "[tihe astronomical rise in re-
ports of child abuse and neglect is stretching the state systems to the breaking
point." Id. at 127. The federal government's policy in directing states to implement
policy initiatives "permitted 50 different state 'systems' to operate." Id. at 128. The
result has been an "overwhelming crisis" of ever-increasing caseloads, inadequately
trained social workers, and insufficient funding. Id. at 128.
6 See COSTIN, supra note 2, at 138. Due to a lack of conformity or consistency in
research methods, researchers believe that child abuse is vastly underreported. See
id. at 135. The child abuse and neglect problem has been likened to an iceberg;, the
small portion of actual cases recorded by authorities is but the tip of the iceberg. See
id. at 137-38. Time wasted investigating false or unsubstantiated reports further
strains human and economic resources. See id. at 135.
' This Note asserts that a child protective proceeding's characterization of the
parent as a child molester affects distinct interests, warranting constitutional pro-
tection. This assertion comports with the Supreme Court's recognition of the need
for additional procedural protections and certainty in matters when the final judg-
ment of the court results in the deprivation of liberty or the imposition of stigma on
the accused. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment);
Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (deportation). The Supreme Court found that
parents facing the termination of parental rights deserved additional protection and
compared a parental termination proceeding's fact-finding hearing to a criminal
trial due to the severity of the consequences and the magnified risk of error. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-62 (1982). New Hampshire, Louisiana, and
cases involving United States Native Americans require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to terminate parental rights. See State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713,
716 (1978); LA. REv. STAT. § 13:1603.A (West Supp. 1982); Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1994).
8 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Although approximately 1 million
incidents of child abuse and neglect are substantiated each year, a national study
estimated that, due to underreporting, 2.8 million children were actually abused
and neglected in 1993. See id. It is estimated that 80% of child abuse and neglect
cases may be attributed to parents and other relatives. See id.
' See THEODORE J. STEIN, CHILD WELFARE AND THE LAW 54 (1991) (discussing
characteristics of families reported for child abuse and neglect). According to a study
conducted by the American Humane Association, approximately 14% of child abuse
is attributed to sexual abuse. See id.; see also Lisa Carpenter, Changing the Bal-
ance: Rhode Island's Amended Termination Of Parental Rights Statute, 60 WASH. U.
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immediately take custody of the child involved and to conduct an
investigation to protect the "best interests" of that child.1' In
protecting the child's best interests, however, the accused par-
ent's due process rights are severely jeopardized. Accusations of
sexual abuse, frequently arising in the context of bitter matri-
monial actions, require an accused parent to defend potentially
unfounded allegations in family court with the likely loss of cus-
todial rights. While due process rights to notice and a hearing
are guaranteed in these civil proceedings, in most states a judge
makes a preliminary determination of the parent's culpability by
utilizing the lowest standard of proof 2 -a preponderance of the
J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 153, 159 n.34 (1996) (discussing the shifting constituents of
child welfare policies from orphaned and abandoned children to those abused at the
hands of their biological families).
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). The doctrine of parens patriae:
[Riefers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons
under legal disability, such as juveniles ... and in child custody determina-
tions, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the
child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take
care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from
their parents.
Id.; see In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. 1978). The doctrine of parens pa-
triae is defined as "the concept that the sovereign is the father of his country." Id.
(citations omitted). Through this doctrine, the state has the power as well as the
duty to protect its minor citizens. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
1 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 31 (discussing standards employed by the various
states to determine whether state intervention into family matters is warranted).
"The best interest standard has typically been interpreted as requiring the decision
maker to make long-range predictions about the effects of parental behaviors on
children." Id. at 31. The author argues that, given the difficulty in making long-
range predictions regarding the needs of children, decisions that result in the sepa-
ration of parent and child should be predicated on proof that the child cannot be
protected from specific harm, rather than "hypotheses" about long-range harm. See
id. at 31-32; see also Meredith Felise Sopher, "The Best of All Possible Worlds":
Balancing Victims' and Defendants' Rights in the Child Sexual Abuse Case, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 639-40 (1994) (discussing states which provide for the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem to represent a child's best interests in a child pro-
tective proceeding).
12 The function of a standard of proof should "instruct the factfinder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of fac-
tual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court stated that "[iln cases involving indi-
vidual rights, whether criminal or civil, '[tihe standard of proof [at a minimum] re-
flects the value society places on individual liberty.' " Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F. 2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)).
[In the typical civil case], society has a minimal concern with the outcome
[and, therefore,] plaintiffs burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the
evidence .... In a criminal case.. . the interests of the defendant are of
such magnitude that.., they have been protected by standards of proof
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evidence. 13 If the state meets this low threshold, the parent may
face deprivation of custodial rights for up to a year or more.1
Furthermore, the stigma of "child molester" immediately at-
taches a devastating effect on a parent's reputation. 5 This loss
designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous
judgment .... The intermediate standard, which usually employs some
combination of the words "clear," cogent," "unequivocal" and "convincing,"
is less commonly used .... One typical use of the standard is in civil cases
involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by
the defendant. The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more
substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly re-
duce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished errone-
ously by increasing the plaintiffs burden of proof.
Id. at 423-424.
13 See generally PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 3-203 (Richard T. Farrell,
ed. 1995). Used primarily in the civil context, litigants, usually suing for monetary
damages meet in court to prove their respective cases, each shouldering an equal
burden of proof. See id. In order to establish proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the fact finder need only believe that a "fact is more probable than its non-
existence." Id. § 3-206 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). "A fair preponderance of evidence does not necessarily mean a greater
number of witnesses; rather, the quality of the evidence is determinative." Id. § 3-
206. In contrast, criminal defendants must be found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. See id. § 3-204. In this instance, any doubt in the factfinder's mind must be
based upon a reason. See id.
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(5)(A)-(F) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). In the event a state
removes a child from a parent's custody, federal law mandates that a dispositional
hearing to determine if out of home placement is to be continued be held within
twelve months.
"' See infra Part III for discussion of the stigma associated with child abuse
registries; see also Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §
5101-5119 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
requires states to maintain systems to report, monitor, and respond to child abuse.
Additionally, see COSTIN, supra note 2, at 34. The Act established the National Cen-
ter on Child Abuse and Neglect charged with duties to research and disseminate
information pertaining to child abuse. See 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
Under its research and reporting function, the National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect must include information on "substantiated reported child abuse cases that
result in civil child protection proceedings or criminal proceedings ... with respect
to which the court makes a finding that abuse or neglect exists and the disposition
of such cases." Id. § 5105(a)(1)(C)(iii). The Supreme Court held that "[w]here a per-
son's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the gov-
ernment is doing to him," a liberty interest may be implicated. Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). See Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433,
1436 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that a couple accused of child abuse were "ex-
posed.., to public opprobrium and may have damaged their standing in the com-
munity"). The mere accusation of sexual abuse of one's child may have disastrous
consequences. See Harry Stein, Explosive Charge, MEN'S HEALTH, July 1993, at 84
(discussing false allegations made in divorce disputes that leave the accused con-
fronting the public perception that "such horrific charges can't be entirely ground-
less"). In the midst of divorce, a New Jersey woman accused her psychologist-
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implicates a personal liberty interest that demands due process
protection as well. 8
The difference between the temporary loss of custodial
rights and permanent termination of parental rights is constitu-
tionally significant. "The United States Supreme Court has
maintained that both parents have a constitutional right to cus-
tody of their children."7 Custody of a child is "[tihe care, control
and maintenance of a child which may be awarded by a court to
one of the parents as in a divorce or separation proceeding.""8
When a parent is not granted custody, there is a temporary re-
linquishment of that care, control, and maintenance by the non-
custodial parent. Conversely, the termination of one's parental
rights results in the "sever ing] completely and irrevocably [of]
the rights of parents in their natural child." 9 Unlike a child cus-
tody decision that is temporary, a parental rights termination
proceeding permanently interferes with the parent's fundamen-
tal constitutional right to raise his or her child. 0
This Note examines the due process concerns of a parent ac-
cused of sexual abuse in a family court's custodial fact-finding
hearing. In these "temporary" dispositions, the majority of
states require that proof of child abuse or neglect be proven by a
husband of sexually abusing their 18-month old child. See id. "One day I was a suc-
cessful psychologist and professor; the next morning the college asked for my resig-
nation and my private practice started to collapse. My whole life was simply wiped
away." Id.
16 This Note focuses on the liberty interests of accused parents but does not
overlook the substantial interests of the child to live free from sexual abuse or mal-
treatment of any kind. The loss of one's reputation demands due process protection.
See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633-34 n.13 (1980) (holding
that conduct damaging reputation in connection with loss of employment implicates
due process); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (explaining that some juris-
dictions increase the plaintiffs burden of proof, thus effectively reducing the risk to
the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously); Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (noting that a protectable liberty interest may
be implicated "[wihere a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake").
17 Brian J. Molton, Solomon's Wisdom or Solomon's Wisdom Lost: Child Custody
in North Dakota-A Presumption That Joint Custody is in the Best Interests of the
Child in Custody Disputes, 73 N.D. L. REV. 263, 269 (1997).
16 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982).
'0 See Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence to Establish Par-
ent's Knowledge or Allowance of Child's Sexual Abuse By Another Under Statute
Permitting Termination of Parental Rights for "Allowing" or "Knowingly Allowing"
Such Abuse to Occur, 53 A.L.R. 5TH 499 (1997).
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preponderance of the evidence. 2' Relying on dicta from Santosky
v. Kramer,22 courts repeatedly find that this same evidentiary
standard is adequate if parents face only a temporary loss of cus-
tody.23 Continued reliance on the distinction between permanent
and temporary loss of custody as a means of justifying the lowest
of evidentiary standards, however, is wrong.
This Note asserts that while children must be protected
from the dangers of child abusers, due process requires a closer
look at the risks to parents answering sexual abuse allegations
in family court. Due to the nature of the accusations, parents
and families may be permanently scarred--by loss of employ-
ment, social status, and potential loss of physical liberty for the
accused as well as by irreparable damage to the family unit--all
interests which are substantially different than those of parents
charged with non-sexual abuse or neglect.' Accordingly, these
parents should be afforded greater due process protection.
It is well established that even carefully drafted procedures
cannot substitute for a deficient standard of proof.2" Courts,
21 See, e.g., In re Five Minor Children, 407 A.2d 198 (Del. 1979) (explaining that
the nature of proceedings to decide parental rights is civil, not penal, thus the pre-
ponderance standard applies); Hernandez v. State ex rel. Arizona Dep't of Econ.
Sec., 530 P.2d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard in termination proceedings).
22 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (finding that proof by a preponderance of the evidence did
not adequately protect the due process rights of parents whose rights were to be
permanently terminated).
23 In its analysis of the risks of erroneously deciding a parental termination
matter, the Court distinguished termination proceedings from custody proceedings.
See id. at 766 n.16. The Court considered that judicial discretion in a custody pro-
ceeding allowed a judge to reconsider and extend temporary placement. See id.; see
also Douglas A. Besharov, Practice Commentary F.C.A. McKinney's Consolidated
Laws of N.Y. § 1046 at 388-89 (McKinney 1983). Mr. Besharov states that the San-
tosky Court's "passing reference is hardly dispositive of this issue" and notes that
evidentiary issues regarding child protective proceedings are "far from settled." Id.
24 See H.R. 1855 Before the House Government and Oversight Committee (1995)
(statement of Hollida Wakefield, M.A., and Ralph Underwager, Ph.D., Institute for
Psychological Therapies) (discussing the disastrous consequences to families re-
sulting from false accusations and lack of procedural protections which "make fair-
ness and due process nigh impossible."); see infra notes 108-59.
25 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). The Court opined that the
'minimum requirements [of procedural due process] being a matter of federal
law.., are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own
procedures that it may deem adequate.' " Id. (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
491 (1980)). States are free to fashion their own statutory schemes regarding mat-
ters of family law. For purposes of this Note, New York law is used to illustrate the
procedural protections and accompanying due process challenges to the use of the
preponderance of the evidence standard.
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however, are reluctant to afford greater rights to parents ac-
cused of sexual abuse.26 In a criminal prosecution, erroneous
outcomes are limited because the state must prove each element
beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest evidentiary standard. 2
As a procedural safeguard, therefore, the standard of proof re-
duces the likelihood of finding an innocent person guilty.' Con-
versely, civil fact-finding hearings 29 use a far lower standard to
expose essentially the same "behavior" and determine parental
culpability, while severely jeopardizing parents' due process
rights.30
This Note examines the preponderance standard as it is ap-
plied in child custody and protection proceedings that originate
with charges of sexual abuse. It considers the conflict inherent
in policies that purport to maintain family integrity while bal-
ancing the competing interests of parent and child. Part One
discusses the historical development of child welfare policy and
the resulting impact on family integrity. This part focuses on
the courts' harmful application of a balancing test in a manner
that trivializes the fate of the accused parent. Part Two dis-
26 See, e.g., In re Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993 (Mass. 1990); In re Katrina W., 575
N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't 1991); Wright v. Arlington County Dep't of Soc. Svc., 388
S.E.2d 477 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).27 See ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 300.4e (1996); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764
("The Court has long considered the heightened standard of proof used in criminal
prosecutions to be 'a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
factual error.'") (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)).
28 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755. The Court noted:
When the State brings a criminal action to deny a defendant liberty or
life... "the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that histori-
cally and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been
protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible
the likelihood of an erroneous judgment."
Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
" See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 62 (1978). The fact-finding hearing is the adjudicatory
stage of the proceeding wherein the allegations are evaluated on the merits; the dis-
positional phase determines the temporary resolution. See id.
Use of the preponderance standard does not comport with Supreme Court ju-
risprudence regarding matters where substantial personal rights have been deter-
mined to be at stake. See PRINCE, supra note 13, at § 3-205. The intermediate stan-
dard of clear and convincing evidence has been used when "policy imperatives
dictate adoption of the higher standard of probability reflected by the term 'clear
and convincing' evidence." Id. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990) (terminating life support systems); Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (terminating
parental rights); Addington, 441 U.S. 418 (confining individual to a mental institu-
tion).
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cusses how judicial challenges to the standard of proof in two
other types of civil actions, civil commitment and juvenile delin-
quency proceedings, resulted in use of an intermediate level of
proof, clear and convincing evidence. It is asserted that parents
facing loss of custody based on sexual abuse accusations face
similar risks, particularly with respect to the stigma which im-
mediately attaches. Part Three examines the fundamental fair-
ness of equal risk-sharing in child protective proceedings of this
type. This part focuses on issues influencing judicial decisions,
recent legislation pertaining to child abuse registries, media ac-
cess to family court proceedings, and the emotionally-charged so-
cial and political climate which further prejudice the rights of
those who may well stand wrongfully accused. This Note con-
cludes that although custody proceedings are civil rather than
criminal, the risks inherent in such proceedings, including the
potential for eventual termination of parental rights, loss of
reputation, and risk of criminal prosecution warrant that the
state prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF CHILD
WELFARE LEGISLATION
A. The Federal View
Matters of family integrity, while not specifically within the
scope of congressional power, 3' are subject to the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment because they have been recognized as
fundamental to individual liberty."2 Parents have a fundamental
" See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 772-73 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning
against the perceived "federalization of family law"); see also Mansell v. Mansell,
490 U.S. 581, 597 (1989) (asserting that the traditional authority of the State in
matters of family law is generally not preempted by federal law); Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (claim-
ing that "although the Constitution is verbally silent on the specific subject of fami-
lies, freedom of personal choice in matters of family life long has been viewed as a
fundamental liberty interest worthy of protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment"); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (locating
the source of the liberty interest in family privacy in traditional notions of basic
human rights, rather than state or federal law); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923). But see Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 624 (1987) (establishing that the Su-
premacy Clause preempts state family law intruding upon substantial federal inter-
ests).
32 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (stating
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right to raise their children free from government interference."
This right, however, must be balanced with the government's
compelling interest in insuring that its minor citizens are free
from abuse and neglect.3
In response to escalating incidences of child abuse and ne-
glect,35 Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
that the Court has traditionally recognized that "freedom of personal choice in mat-
ters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment"); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974);
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (1925).
'" See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66. The Supreme Court stated that "[it is cardi-
nal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the par-
ents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 166. This right is of such magnitude that
it is not necessarily preempted by a parent's failings or even a temporary loss of cus-
tody. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
See STEIN, supra note 9, at 26-27 (discussing the evolution of American fam-
ily law from the 1800s, when parental rights were seemingly infinite, to the contem-
porary approach, which seeks to serve the best interests of the child in a balancing
of parents' and children's rights); see also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343
(1997) (recognizing the federal government's compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren's psychological and physical well-being); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 (asserting
that the government's "parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the wel-
fare of the child" is implicated in parental rights termination proceedings); J.B. v.
Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 1997) (observing that the interests
of the parent and child implicated by a forced separation must be weighed against
the government's compelling interest as parens patriae in protecting minors from
abuse); Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 1309 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
liberty interest shared by parent and child in each other's care and companionship
is limited by government's interest in ensuring that children are protected from
abuse); Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that the
State has a compelling interest in the welfare and safety of children due to its status
as parens patriae); In re Department of Public Welfare, 421 N.E.2d 28, 36 (Mass.
1981) (observing that "[tihe State as parens patriae may act to protect minor chil-
dren from serious physical or emotional harm"); see also CLIVE GRACE, SOCIAL
WORKERS, CHILDREN, AND THE LAW 1 (1994) (stating that "social and political con-
cern oscillates between anxiety that children are failing to get adequate protection
from abuse, and worry that family and parental feelings are too readily overridden
by the child-protection system"); STEIN, supra note 9, at 26-28 (discussing the evo-
lution of American family law from the 1800s when parental rights were seemingly
infinite, to the contemporary approach, which seeks to serve the best interests of
the child in a balancing of parents' and children's rights).
"' "Between 1976 and 1989, reports of child abuse and neglect rose by
259% ... and [ increased [again] by 50% between 1985 and 1992." AMERICA'S
CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 45 (1993) (A.B.A., Re-
port by Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children and
Their Families, 1993) (internal citations omitted). The report asserts that public
policy must be redirected from intervention to prevention of child abuse and neglect.
See id. at 45-46.
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ment Act,36 which mandated that each state report and respond
to evidence of child abuse in order to receive certain grants.
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act ("The Child Wel-
fare Act")38 was enacted to address concern regarding long-term
foster placements and the need for permanency planning.39 The
86 Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 5 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1994 &
Sup1 . II 1996)).
See id. § 5106(a). In addition to establishing the National Center on Child
Abuse, the Act provides federal funds for state child abuse prevention and treat-
ment programs. See id.; STEIN, supra note 9, at 43-46. The Act has been amended
and its programs expanded many times. See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266, 92 Stat. 205 (1978)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §5101 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) (expanding grant-
making authority); Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat.
1749 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5101) (improving program regard-
ing family violence prevention and associated services); Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, 110 Stat. 3063 (1996)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5119 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) (reauthoriz-
ing the Act); see also S. REP. No. 104-117, at 4-6 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3493-95 (providing history of federal involvement in child abuse
and neglect). In 1984, Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention Federal Chal-
lenge Grants Act to encourage states to implement programs for child abuse preven-
tion. See id. at 5, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3494. In fiscal year 1990, 47
states qualified for funds. See id. The Children's Justice and Assistance Act, enacted
in 1986, created new state grants to improve "judicial handling of child abuse cases,
especially those involving child sexual abuse." See Pub. L. No. 99-401, 100 Stat. 903
(1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5117 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). In order to qualify for
funding, states must provide for "(1)... reporting of child abuse... (2) investiga-
tions of [the] reports ... (3) ... confidentiality of all records concerning abuse and
neglect; (4) guardian ad litem to represent the child in any court proceedings; (5)
public education on child abuse and neglect; and (6) immunity for persons who re-
port in good faith." STEIN, supra note 9, at 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)-(c) (estab-
lishing eligibility requirements for federal grants to stakes for use in programs tar-
geted at the prevention and treatment of child abuse and neglect).
8 Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 501 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 670 (1994 &
Supp. II 1996).
See STEIN, supra note 9, at 36-43. The goals of the Act were to prevent re-
moval of the child from the home of his or her natural family whenever possible and
to avoid placing children in long-term foster placement by reunifying families or fa-
cilitating adoptions. See id. at 37. Studies had shown that permanency planning was
less expensive than foster care, and that by providing extensive social services,
families could remain together. See id. Budget cuts, however, have severely limited
the success of permanency planning. See COSTIN, supra note 2, at 123.
In the absence of intensive support services, permanency planning for
many children became a revolving door-placement in foster care, reunifica-
tion with the biological parent(s), then a return to foster care.. . [Olne
four-year old New York boy.., was placed in thirty-seven different homes
over two months and.., another [child] had been placed in seventeen
homes in twenty-five days.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Carpenter, supra note 9, at 159 (1996) (dis-
cussing provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980). Per-
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Child Welfare Act states that, absent serious harm, children
should remain with their parents.0 The states, however, were
directed to provide "child welfare services" for the purpose of
"preventing, or remedying, or assisting in the solution of prob-
lems, which may result in the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or de-
linquency of children."" The Child Welfare Act allows for emer-
gency removal of a child from his or her home, but mandates
that a dispositional hearing be held within twelve months of the
removal.4" States, however, must employ all "reasonable efforts"
to prevent such removal, and facilitate the child's return home
when removal is unnecessary.'
manency planning is "the systematic process of carrying out, within a brief, time-
limited period, a set of goal-directed activities designed to help children live in
families that offer continuity of relationships with nurturing parents or caretakers
and the opportunity to establish lifetime relationships." Id. at 158 n.32 (quoting
Katherine S. Homer, Program Abuse in Foster Care: A Search for Solutions, 1 VA. J.
SOC. POLY & L. 177, 185 (1993)).
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. H 1996) (establishing that social
services should be directed toward "preventing the unnecessary separation of chil-
dren from their families by identifying family problems, assisting families in re-
solving their problems, and preventing breakup of the family where the prevention
of child removal is desirable and possible").
4'1 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1)(B).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (recently changing, in Novem-
ber 1997, the time period within which a dispositional hearing must be held from 18
months to 12 months); see also STEIN, supra note 9, at 40-41 (discussing federal re-
quirements that cases be reviewed to insure that children are returned to their
families whenever possible). In order to ensure that a child's development is not un-
duly interrupted, separation from his or her parents must be for as short a time as
possible. See Lori Klein, Doing What's Right: Providing Culturally Competent Reuni-
fication Services, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 20, 38 (1997) (claiming that a parent's
interest in the companionship, care, and custody of a child and the child's right to a
safe and stable home justify allowing the parent to retain custody, unless the parent
has been shown to be unfit) (internal citations omitted); Carpenter, supra note 9, at
159-60, 163-65 (arguing that long term separation from a child's parent can impede
the development of the child) (internal citations omitted); Jennifer Ayres Hand, Pre-
venting Undue Terminations: A Critical Evaluation of the Length-of-Time-Out-of-
Custody Ground for Termination of Parental Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251, 1257
(1996) (recognizing that even a relatively brief separation from the parent can have
grave effects on a child, as "psychological development depends on a secure, unin-
terrupted relationship with one caregiver") (internal citations omitted); Jill Sheldon,
50,000 Children Are Waiting: Permanency, Planning and Termination of Parental
Rights Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 17 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 73, 78-79 (1997) (analyzing the governmental efforts to prevent foster
care drift).
I 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). See STEIN, supra note 9, at 38
(discussing the requirement that, before a child is placed outside the family home,
the state must demonstrate its efforts to avoid that course of action by first using
less intrusive means); see also Jessica A. Graf, Note, Can Courts and Welfare Agen-
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B. The Common Law View
Temporary loss of custody is primarily determined by proof
by a preponderance of the evidence, regardless of whether the
parent is accused of neglect, physical abuse, or sexual abuse."
This standard, which reflects minimal societal interest in the
outcome and carries a substantial risk of error,' does not protect
the due process rights of parents in temporary custody proceed-
ings,46 nor does it support federal policy goals of protecting fami-
lies from unwarranted governmental intervention.4 v  Conse.
quently, while preservation of family integrity continues to be a
societal goal, courts continue to hold that the temporary and re-
versible nature of custodial dispositions justifies the preponder-
ance standard.48
cies Save the Family? An Examination of Permanency Planning, Family Preserva-
tion, and The Reasonable Efforts Requirement, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 81, 97-102
(1996) (discussing Congressional intent to encourage the correction of problems re-
garding permanency planning by enacting the Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act of 1980).
4See Mallory v. Mallory, 539 A.2d 995, 997 (Conn. 1988) (recognizing that, in
child custody hearings, "a preponderance of the evidence standard adequately pro-
tects a parent from false accusations of sexual abuse, and that the ordinary civil
standard of proof better serves the strong societal interest in protecting children
from abusive parents"); In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1323 (Conn.
1983) (holding that "the proper standard of proof in temporary custody hearings is
the normal civil standard of a fair preponderance of the evidence"); New Jersey Div.
of Youth and Family Servs. v. V.K, 565 A.2d 706, 714 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (observing that in temporary custody proceedings, as opposed to hearings for
the termination of parental rights, the State must prove its case by a preponderance
of the evidence); In re N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Servs. v. Oscar C., 600 N.Y.S.2d 957,
959 (2d Dep't. 1993) (ruling that the preponderance of the evidence standard is ap-
propriate when the parent faces a temporary loss of custody); Wright v. Arlington
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 388 S.E.2d 477, 479 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that
"the preponderance of the evidence standard is an appropriate standard for an
abuse and neglect proceeding which may lead to temporary placement of the child");
see also 43 C.J.S. Infants § 61 (1978 & Supp. 1997).
"See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 768 (1982). The Court held that the clear and convincing standard of proof
"adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his fac-
tual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process." Id. at 769.
4See id. at 768.
" See id. at 762 (delineating the risks of erroneous fact-finding attributable to
the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in the context of cases re-
garding the termination of parental rights); see also supra note 41 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the federal preference for maintaining the integrity of the
home).
4See, e.g., In re Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 997 (Mass. 1990) (recognizing that "a
significant consideration [in a due process analysis] is 'the permanency of the
threatened loss' ") (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758); In re Tammie Z., 484 N.E.2d
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In Stanley v. Illinois,' decided in 1972, the Supreme Court
determined that the right to raise a family is "essential" and
worthy of constitutional protection.5° The Court reviewed the
due process rights of an unwed father and held that the state
must provide unwed fathers with procedural protections afford-
ing them the opportunity to prove their parental fitness.51 In
doing so, the Court demonstrated its willingness to delve into
matters concerning family integrity in order to protect parents'
due process rights."
The Stanley court protected unwed fathers' due process
rights by overturning a statute that presumed them to be unfit
parents.53 Like the father in Stanley, family litigants in a child
1038, 1039 (N.Y. 1985) (per curiam) (contrasting the gravity of a potential error in a
permanent termination of parental rights with an 18-month maximum custodial
disposition); Wright, 388 S.E.2d at 478-79 (finding that a parent's interest in tempo-
rary foster care placement is not as substantial as his or her interest in a perma-
nent termination of parental rights); Mary D. v. Watt, 438 S.E.2d 521, 526 n.11 (W.
Va. 1992) (noting that the interim nature of temporary custody determinations jus-
tifies allowing courts to err on the side of protecting children at the expense of pa-
rental rights).
49 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
50 Id. at 651. The court noted, "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id.
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
51 See id. at 658. The father challenged a statute that denied him a hearing re-
garding his fitness as a parent following the death of his children's mother. See id.
at 646. Under this statute, upon their mother's death, children of unwed fathers be-
come wards of the state. See id. The father claimed that this statute discriminated
against unmarried fathers, thus violatind his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. The Court agreed, and established
that the constitutionally protected right to family integrity entitled the father to a
fair hearing, wherein Stanley could assert his fitness. See id. at 657-58. The Court
stated, "It]he private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing inter-
est, protection." Id. at 651. If through this process, Stanley showed himself to be a
fit parent, the statutory policy would be served by leaving custody with the parent,
rather than the state. See id. at 655. Although a due process claim had not been
raised, the Court next evaluated the Constitutionality of procedures utilized by the
state to advance its interest in protecting children. See id. at 652.
52 See id. at 651. The Court also affirmed the states' power to protect children,
even if it necessitated removing children from their parents' custody. See id. at
655-56.
"See id. at 650. Under the Illinois statute, unwed fathers lacking parental
status were excluded from the proceedings because their unfitness was "presumed
at law." Id. The father's claim to his children was deemed to be "irrelevant" under
the statute. Id. The statute based its presumption of unfitness on the generalization
that "most" unwed fathers were unfit. Id. at 654.
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custody proceeding must be protected from due process viola-
tions which "needlessly risk running roughshod over the impor-
tant interests of both parent and child."'
Nine years later, the Court again had cause to consider pa-
rental due process rights. In Santosky v. Kramer,55 the Supreme
Court reviewed a New York statute providing for the termina-
tion of parental rights due to the parent's neglect or abuse.' The
Court examined what process was due to assure that the par-
ents' rights were constitutionally protected.
57 In a 5-4 decision,58
the Court held that, given the grievous nature of the loss-per-
manent dissolution of the family-due process required no less
than clear and convincing evidence to support the allegations
brought against the parents by the State. The Court applied
the three-part test that was first fashioned in Mathews v. El-
dridge,' which weighed the rights of the parent and child, the
risk of erroneous determinations on the parties, and the govern-
ment's interest in retaining the existing procedures.6'
'4 Id. at 657.
55 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
m See id. at 747 (stating that New York law allowed the state to terminate the
natural parent's rights in their child upon a showing that the child had been "per-
manently neglected") (citing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b.4.(d), 384-b.7.(a)
(McKinney 1981-82)).
57 See id. at 753.
58 Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor joined in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent. See id. at 770-91. The dissent warned that the decision invited
the federal courts to "intru[de] into every facet of state family law." Id. at 770.
"See id. at 747-48 (holding that New York law, which allowed termination of
parental rights upon the same level of proof necessary for an award of monetary
damages in a civil trial, provided insufficient protection to the parents' due process
rights ).
"424 U.S. 319 (1976). In this case, Eldridge, a disabled veteran, brought suit
when the government stopped payment of his disability benefits, as they had deter-
mined he was no longer disabled. See id. at 324-25. Eldridge challenged the proce-
dures utilized and asserted that a hearing was required before benefits were discon-
tinued. See id. at 325.
61 The Mathews Court fashioned a three-part test to determine what process
was due:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro-
cedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
Additionally, see Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 (assessing the three distinct factors
in Eldridge). "[Tihe minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process re-
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The first of the test's three factors is the private interest
affected by the challenged proceeding. 2 The Court recognized
the "grievous loss"' facing the parent and the permanency of the
outcome in a termination proceeding.6 Noting the permanent,
irreversible nature of the parents' loss, the interests of the par-
ents were found to be so substantial that heightened procedural
protections were favored.6
The second factor under the test considers the risks to the
parties created by the procedure.66 The Court found that the
preponderance standard's pitting of the individual against the
state,67 the disparity of resources," and the roughly equal shar-
ing of risks 9 carried the risk of quantitative judgments to the
parent's detriment. The Court reasoned that should the state
quirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected,
but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed be-
tween the litigants." Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
6 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754.
Id. at 758 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
See id. at 759. The state seeks "not merely to infringe that fundamental lib-
erty interest, but to end it." Id.
65See id.
6'See id. at 761. The Court noted that termination proceedings at the fact-
finding stage "bearD many of the indicia of a criminal trial." Id. at 762. The Court
considered the state's ability to marshal its assets to build a case against the parent,
the potential for cultural or class bias, and the subjective nature of the decision-
making. See id. at 762-63.
See id. at 759.
See id. at 764.
69See id. at 768. The Court stated that the sharing of risks was "constitutionally
intolerable." Id.; see also Note, Balancing Children's Rights into the Divorce Deci-
sion, 13 VT. L. REV. 531, 559 (1989) (noting that a higher standard of proof is neces-
sary for balancing risks, when dealing with forced termination of parental rights);
H. Joseph Gitlin, A Legislative Remedy to the Baby Richard Problem, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Mar. 17, 1997, at 5 (stating that "[a] standard of proof that allocates the risk
of error nearly equally between an erroneous failure to terminate, which leaves the
child in an uneasy status quo, and an erroneous termination, which unnecessarily
destroys the natural family, does not reflect properly the relative severity of these
two outcomes").
70 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-64. "A standard of proof that by its very terms
demands consideration of the quantity, rather than the quality, of the evidence may
misdirect the factfinder in the marginal case." Id. at 764. The decision suggests that
erroneous determinations are exacerbated by the vulnerability of the parents. See
id. at 762-63. "Because parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor,
uneducated, or members of minority groups, [ I] such proceedings are often vulner-
able to judgments based on cultural or class bias." Id. at 763 (citing Smith v. Or-
ganization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 833-35 (1977) (citation omitted)). When
Smith was decided, 52.23% of children in foster care were black and 25.5% were
39 CATHOLic LAWYER, NOS. 2-3
erroneously terminate parental fights, the child, who is already
in the custody of the state, would remain in foster care or would
be deemed available for adoption.7' It recognized that, from the
parent's perspective, the risk of error would result in the perma-
nent destruction of the family.72 Thus, the Court determined
that a preponderance standard did not properly allocate the
risks to parent and child.73
The third factor evaluated by the Santosky court was the
government interest supporting the use of the state's procedure.74
The Court stated that the preponderance standard was consis-
tent with the state's two interests: providing for the welfare of
the child and reducing the fiscal burdens of protective proceed-
ings.7'5 The Court then considered, however, that New York al-
ready applied a clear and convincing standard in termination
proceedings based on a parent's diminished mental capacity and
in cases of severe and repeated child abuse.76 Thus, the Court
concluded that the state would not be unduly burdened by ap-
plying the elevated standard in parental termination proceed-
ings based on neglect.77
The Santosky dissent shared the majority's desire to reduce
the risk of error in termination proceedings, but asserted that
procedural protections adequately served this purpose.7" How-
Puerto Rican. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 833-34. The Smith Court noted that social
workers tend to resist returning children placed in affluent foster homes to their
poorer parents. See id. at 834.
71 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765-66. The risk to the child, in the words of the
Court, is "preservation of an uneasy status quo." Id.
71 See id. at 766 (discussing how erroneous termination for the natural parent
"is the unnecessary destruction of their natural family").
7' See id. at 765 (stating that this allocation of risk of error between parent and
child is "fundamentally mistaken"); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423
(1979) (holding the State to a higher burden of persuasion to "share the risk of error
in roughly equal fashion").
74 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766.71 See id.
78 See id. at 767.
77 See id. at 768. The Court noted that New York also required proof by clear
and convincing evidence for matters involving contract reformation and for proof of
traffic infractions. See id. at 767-68. The Court found that there would be no undue
burden on the state "to require that its factfinders have the same factual certainty
when terminating the parent-child relationship as they must have to suspend a
driver's license." Id. at 768.
78 See id. at 786 n.12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition to its multi-phased
fact-finding and disposition procedures for both custody and termination proceed-
ings, the dissent noted that New York's family court further reduced the risk by
having one judge supervise a case from initial removal through final termination.
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ever, the "minimum requirements [of procedural due process]
being a matter of federal law ... are not diminished by the fact
that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may
deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse offi-
cial action."79 Procedures such as separate fact-finding and dis-
positional hearings that afford the parent notice and a hearing
cannot substitute for a constitutionally deficient standard of
proof.' A preponderance standard, found to be constitutionally
deficient in Santosky, is even more egregious when applied in
custody matters that concern sexual abuse. These proceedings,
like the parental termination proceedings reviewed in Santosky,
require greater scrutiny given the individual interests at stake.
In dicta, the Court distinguished the permanent, irreversible
nature of a termination proceeding from a custody proceeding.8'
Thereafter, courts have relied on Santosky82 and have applied its
analysis to justify the use of a preponderance of the evidence
standard for fact-finding hearings involving temporary neglect
and abuse dispositions.'
Reliance on Santosky's dicta as support for the use of the
preponderance standard of proof is unfair. Specifically, in de-
termining that parental termination proceedings required a
higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence,
the Santosky court observed that "the factual certainty required
to extinguish the parent-child relationship [utilizing a prepon-
derance standard] is no greater than that necessary to award
money damages in an ordinary civil action."" Similarly, a parent
faced with the prospect of losing custody of a child should be af-
forded more certainty and less error than he or she would expect
See id. The dissent noted that this gave the judge the opportunity to become "inti-
mately familiar" with the case. Id.
7 Id. at 755 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)).
'0 See id. at 753-55 (discussing the fairness of state procedures in parental ter-
mination actions and federal concern with ensuring due process).
"' See id. at 748.
'2 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing that courts rely on dicta
in Santosky and utilize the preponderance standard in child abuse and neglect
cases).
' See, e.g., In re Tammie Z., 484 N.E.2d 1038, 1038 (N.Y. 1985) (per curiam)
(noting that the appellants argued that the appropriate standard to follow is clear
and convincing evidence, as applied in Santosky, and not a preponderance stan-
dard); In re New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 600 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (2d Dep't
1993) (explaining that a preponderance standard is to be used in temporary neglect
cases).
' Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747.
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in an action for money damages. When the loss of custody is
compounded by the stigma that accompanies allegations of sex-
ual abuse, the nature of the parent's loss becomes far more
grievous.
Furthermore, reliance on Santosky and the Mathews three-
part test has produced considerable controversy." Even within a
single jurisdiction, there has been strong disagreement as to the
proper standard of proof." The explanation is simple. Courts
have failed to distinguish the Santosky court's careful analysis of
risk factors peculiar to a parental termination proceeding based
on permanent neglect, and those risk factors peculiar to tempo-
rary custody proceedings which may involve allegations of ne-
glect, 7 physical abuse," sexual abuse,89 or any combination of the
three.9
' See Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of
Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 985 (1988) (discussing the "patchwork of deci-
sions that leave many questions unanswered").
Compare In re Christine H., 451 N.Y.S.2d 983, 986 (Faro. Ct. Queens County
1982) (finding that more serious interests that are affected required proof by clear
and convincing evidence), with Tammie Z., 484 N.E.2d at 1039 (holding that pre-
ponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard).
87 See BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d. 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1986) (alleging that children
were being neglected because they were in blistering heat all day, were filthy, and
had severe diaper rash); In re Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 994-95 (Mass. 1990) (finding
sufficient evidence that eight children were neglected based on their unkept house,
an inadequate number of beds forcing three children to share one bunk bed and an-
other child to sleep in a chair, lack of a privacy barrier between male and female
children, the children's serious tardiness at school, absenteeism and emotional
problems, and their father's admitted drinking problem).
See In re Kasheena M., 666 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (1st Dep't 1997) (removing chil-
dren from parents' custody after a finding of physical abuse); In re Jennifer Q., 652
N.Y.S.2d 829, 830 (3d Dep't 1997) (finding physical abuse as evidenced by photo-
graphs of bruises); In re Fred S., 322 N.Y.S.2d 170, 181 (Faro. Ct. Richmond County
1971) (finding physical abuse based on medical records evidencing that a three-year
old grl had been badly battered to the extent that hospitalization was required).
See In re Jaclyn P., 658 N.E.2d 1042, 1043 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that the pre-
ponderance standard was satisfied by the child's out of court statements alleging
sexual abuse by her father with corroboration by a social worker's testimony and
evaluation of the child using anatomical dolls), cert. denied, Papa v. Nassau County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 516 U.S. 1093 (1996).
90 See April K v. Boston Children's Serv. Ass'n, 581 F. Supp. 711, 711-13 (D.
Mass. 1984) (describing incidents which indicated that a young child was both
physically and sexually abused); see also 43 C.J.S. Infants § 61 (1978) ("Other such
matters which may support a finding of neglect or dependency include failure to
work regularly or provide adequately for the family, debauchery or immoral conduct
of parent, parental strife or marital discord, misconduct or criminal behavior of the
child, and failure of the child to attend school.").
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1. The Parent's Private Interests
In In re Christine H.,9' a New York trial court noted that the
distinct parental interests affected in custody proceedings in-
volving allegations of sexual abuse are "the stigma of child
abuse, possible criminal prosecutions, and possible termination
of parental rights."2 The court reviewed evidence supporting the
mother's allegations that the father had touched and rubbed
their three-year old daughter's genitals, grabbed her, and
punched her.9 In consideration of the substantial interests of
the parent facing sexual abuse allegations,' the grave risk of er-
ror,95 and the slight countervailing government interest in util-
izing the preponderance standard,' the court applied the clear
and convincing standard and dismissed the abuse petition.97
Three years later, in In re Tammie Z.,8 the New York Court
of Appeals considered the appropriate standard of proof regard-
ing a petition alleging neglect." Three children who had been in
the care of their father had been removed from his custody for
eighteen months. °° The Court, in a per curiam decision, held
9' 451 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Fam. Ct. Queens County 1982).
Id. at 986 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
'3 See id. at 983-84. The father denied all of the allegations and suggested that
the timing of the petition was related to marital discord. See id. at 984.
' See id. at 985-86. The court reconsidered traditional adherence to the pre-
ponderance rule in civil family court matters in view of the then-recent decision in
Santosky v. Kramer and an amendment to New York law that added child abuse as
a predicate act on which parental termination could be sought. See id. at 985. The
court noted the potential for criminal prosecution, and the Family Court Act's defi-
nitions of "severe" and "repeated" abuse which "establishe[d] a rigorous standard for
the proof of both intent and injury, which parallels similar language in the Penal
Law." Id. at 986 n.1. Felony sex offenses actionable under the Family Court Act
were also identified. See id.
95 See id. at 984. The father's attorney compared the applicable statute to a
criminal statute, thus warranting proof by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at
984. The court noted the great risk of error given the "subjective predictions" and
"calculated gambles" involved, as well as the preponderance standard's susceptibil-
ity to misinterpretation. Id. at 987 (citation omitted).
98 See id. at 986-87. The court reasoned that the preponderance standard could
satisfy governmental interest regarding findings of neglect, but more serious abuse
findings warranted the clear and convincing standard of proof. See id. at 987.
" See id. at 987.
484 N.E.2d 1038 (N.Y. 1985) (per curiam).
See id. at 1038. "In a fact-finding hearing to determine whether a child is [or
has been] abused or neglected, the provision of Family Court Act § 1046(b) that a
finding of neglect 'must be based on a preponderance of the evidence' affords due
process under the Federal Constitution." Id.10o See id. at 1038. The petition had claimed that the children were neglected
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that the preponderance standard utilized at the fact-finding
hearing was sufficient as a matter of law.'0 ' It rejected the fa-
ther's argument that the clear and convincing standard should
apply to fact-finding hearings; the court relied on the three-part
test utilized in Santosky. °  The court concluded that "[tihe bal-
ance of interests.., differs materially from [parental termina-
tion proceedings]."1 °3 The court distinguished custody and ter-
mination proceedings and determined that the preponderance
standard was sufficient given the temporary nature of a custody
disposition.'0°
In In re Katrina W.,'05 a parent challenged the burden of
proof to be used in a sexual abuse case. Based on testimony and
medical evidence offered at a fact-finding hearing, the court de-
termined that Katrina had been sexually abused by her fifteen
year old brother, thus subjecting her to removal from her
mother's custody.'0° The mother appealed, challenging the suffi-
within the meaning of section 1012(f) of the Family Court Act. See N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 1012(f) (McKinney 1983).
101 See Tammie Z., 484 N.E. 2d at 1038-39.
102 See id. at 1039. This test involves the balancing of private interests, the
chance of mistake with a state's procedure, and the governmental interest support-
ing the procedure. See id.
103 Id.
104 See id. at 1038-39. But cf In re Pablo C., 439 N.Y.S.2d 229, 234 (Fam. Ct.
Bronx County 1980) (determining that clear and convincing evidence is the proper
standard of proof for proceedings to suspend visitation for parents whose children
were removed from home by the state). The court recognized the risk of error in
utilizing the lower preponderance standard and articulated the need to preserve
family integrity:
Use of the higher standard would reflect the premise of state policy and
the Constitution that maintenance of the family unit is the preferred solu-
tion, and would serve to further those particularly important interests of
the child and parent by reducing the likelihood of erroneous decisions to
suspend visitation. Given the interests of the child in being returned home
if possible, and the interest of the state in effectuating that outcome, and
given the fact that supervised visitation provides protection for the child, it
is not apparent that there is any countervailing interest on the part of the
child or state which would be furthered by use of the "preponderance"
standard or justify the increased likelihood of erroneous decisions concomi-
tant with its use.
Id. at 233.
100 575 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't 1991) (per curiam) (affirming a decision to remove
a child from her mother's custody due to sexual abuse by a sibling).
1'0 See id. at 709. The court concluded that removal was necessary because Ka-
trina's brother, who was discharged to a relative's home, had returned to the family
home. See id.
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ciency of the evidence"7 and the court's application of the pre-
ponderance standard in the context of a proceeding involving
sexual abuse.' 8 Distinguishing In re Tammie Z., the court noted
that the Court of Appeals decision "did not explicitly refer to
findings of abuse."'" The court then considered the issue of what
standard should apply in sexual abuse cases."0  Applying the
Mathews three-part due process test, the court found that the
governmental interest in protecting children from sexual abuse
was "even more compelling" than in neglect matters."' Yet, the
court still rejected the contention that more weight be accorded
parents' interests in sexual abuse proceedings than in matters
concerning neglect."2
2. The Risk of Erroneous Custodial Deprivation
The second Mathews factor is the risk of error and its impact
on the parties." 3 In In re Christine H., the court emphasized the
accused parent's substantial private interests in a matter alleg-
ing sexual abuse."' The court noted that there was no physical
evidence of abuse,"5 that the child's testimony contradicted her
107 See id. at 708. Medical evidence presented by Social Services included a pe-
diatrician who testified to Katrina's enlarged hymeneal opening and vaginal scar-
ring as being consistent with intercourse. See id. A guidance counselor also testified
that Katrina discussed her brother's "raping" of her. See id. On appeal, the court
found that the evidence supported a finding of abuse. See id.
108 See id. at 706. Katrina's mother claimed the evidentiary standard did not af-
ford procedural due process. See id.
0o Id. at 706.
110 See id.
" Id. at 708. The court stated, "the [sitate's parens patriae interest in promot-
ing the welfare of the child is even more compelling where the petition alleges
abuse." Id.
11 See id. at 707. A parent is not subject to criminal sanctions simply because
there is a finding of sexual abuse. Furthermore, the court found that the stigma at-
tached to an abuse finding, as opposed to a finding of neglect, does not "require a
higher burden of proof." Id. at 707-08.
11 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
114 See In re Christine H., 451 N.Y.S.2d 983, 986 (Fam. Ct. Queens County
1982).
.. See id. at 984. The mother testified that her husband began sexually abusing
their younger child the previous summer. See id. The child, aged 4, had stated that
her father "put his bone in my mouth and ma[dle pee pee all over my mouth." Id.
The child had repeated this and similar accounts in the presence of a third person.
See id. Neither the younger child nor the third party testified. See id. The mother
also alleged that the respondent father rubbed the younger daughter's genitals. The
father had allegedly beaten, pushed, and punched an older daughter. See id. The
mother further alleged that her husband drank excessively and took valium. See id.
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mother's,"6 and that there was reason to question the timing and
motivation behind the claims of abuse."7 The court dismissed
the petition, stating that the risks associated with the "more se-
rious finding of child abuse""8 and the preponderance standard's
"susceptib[ility] to misinterpretation" justified the use of clear
and convincing evidence."'
The Court of Appeals, however, in In re Tammie Z., 20 noted
that the "risk of error" 2' associated with the court's protection of
the child was only temporary-it "remain[ed] in effect only
pending a final order of disposition." 12   Thus, if the clear and
convincing evidence standard could not be met, the petition for
protection would be dismissed, subjecting the child to undesir-
able risk-the child would be returned to the potentially abusive
parents if the abuse or neglect was not proved. 3 The court, cog-
nizant of the "disastrous consequences"'2' an erroneous dismissal
at 983. The mother testified that she had consulted with an attorney in mid-August
but that the attorney "advised her to do nothing until an understanding could be
reached." Id. at 984.
"' See id. at 984. The court found that the older child's testimony lacked credi-
bility, due to her "anger and resolve to have no dealings with her father." Id. The
court determined that the child was "strongly influenced" by her mother and al-
though her testimony supported some of her mother's testimony, it contradicted her
mother's version in material respects. Id.
..7 See id. The father claimed that the timing of his wife's allegations was not
coincidental: the police complaint containing the allegations occurred after he or-
dered his wife's parents out of the marital home, one week after his wife had passed
her medical exams, and during a time when he was traveling abroad for several
weeks. See id.
Id. at 987.
19 Id. "As in so many of these child abuse proceedings, the events have occurred
away from the view of outside disinterested parties and therefore credibility be-
comes a major factor in seeking to determine the truth." Id. at 984. The court noted
the risks associated with subjective decisions in child custody matters. See id. at
987. The opinion suggested that the accused parent's liberty interests and the
stigma associated with a finding of child abuse required greater certainty despite
the proceeding's civil nature. See id. at 986-87 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 425 (1979) (ruling on civil commitment proceedings), and In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (involving a civil juvenile delinquency proceeding)). The deci-
sion noted that the Supreme Court had applied the clear and convincing evidence
standard in both types of proceedings, due to the particular importance of the indi-
vidual's interests and the need for greater certainty. See id. at 986.
'20 484 N.E.2d 1038 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that the preponderance standard in a
neglect matter affords due process under federal law).
121 Id. at 1039. The court found risk of mistake to be a "fundamental difference"
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might have on a victimized child, affirmed the lower court's
findings." In In re Katrina W.,'26 the court rejected the mother's
argument that threats of criminal prosecution, parental termina-
tion and the stigma associated with sexual abuse allegations
warranted application of the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard.127 The court asserted that parental concern with termina-
tion of parental rights was misplaced because clear and con-
vincing evidence would be applied in termination proceedings.'
Ultimately, the court rejected the contention that the stigma re-
sulting from a finding of abuse was "sufficiently greater" than
that for neglect. 2  Relying on In re Tammie Z,'30 the holding in
In re Katrina W. was consistent with other New York decisions
which have held that a preponderance of the evidence standard
in sexual abuse cases does not offend due process.'
Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion. The
Massachusetts statutory scheme does not specify the standard of
proof to be utilized in a hearing that temporarily transfers cus-
tody from the parent to the state pending further investigation
into whether the child is suffering or is in danger of serious
abuse or neglect. 32 Utilizing the Mathew three-part test and in
125 See id. at 1038 (finding the father had neglected his children resulting in
their placement with the Department of Social Services).
12 575 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't 1991).
127 See id. at 707-08. The court acknowledged that subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion, while a possibility, would be "completely independent" and that no criminal
sanctions attached to a finding in a family court proceeding. Id. at 707. The court
acknowledged the "less rigid" rules of hearsay and corroboration applied in child
protective proceedings. Id.
'28 See id. at 708 (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(g) (McKinney 1992)).
129 Id.
1"o See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (discussing Tammie Z.).
121 See In re Katrina W., 575 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (citing In re Nicole V., 518
N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1987) (finding of abuse or neglect need only be proved by prepon-
derance of the evidence); In re Linda K., 521 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't 1987) (finding
that neglect or abuse determination must be based on preponderance of the evi-
dence rather than clear and convincing evidence standard); In re Ryan D., 516
N.Y.S.2d 606 (2d Dep't 1987) (determining that the trial court erroneously applied a
clear and convincing standard of proof but dismissing the petition for failure to meet
the lower preponderance standard).
22 See In re Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 995-96 (Mass. 1990). The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts recognized that § 24 was clear in its requirement that a
"reasonable cause" standard be met in an initial hearing regarding emergency re-
moval. Id. at 996. The court recognized that when a statute does not specify the evi-
dentiary standard of proof to be applied, the standard must comply with due proc-
ess. See id. The court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard
sufficiently protected the parties involved. See id. at 1001. Additionally, see MASS.
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consideration of the temporary nature of the loss, a Massachu-
setts court, in In re Robert,"u rejected the clear and convincing
standard in favor of the preponderance standard."3 The higher
standard, the court determined, would put children at too much
risk of being "erroneously returned to abusive or neglectful par-
ents. 135
Similar reasoning, on the state level, has resulted in the
predominant use of the preponderance standard in abuse and
neglect proceedings in Maine,3 ' Colorado,137 and Virginia.lu Cali-
fornia, however, applies the preponderance standard in depend-
ency hearings in matters concerning abuse, but only in those
that do not result in removal of the child from parental cus-
tody."9 The more stringent clear and convincing standard has
been confined to matters that "sever the parent-child relation-
ship, either temporarily or permanently."4 0 Finally, in contrast,
GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24 (1994).
13s 556 N.E.2d 993 (Mass. 1990).
134 See id. at 998; see also supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text (discussing
the particulars of the Mathews test).
"5 Id. at 1001.
186 See, e.g., In re Sabrina M., 460 A.2d 1009 (Me. 1983) (finding of sexual abuse
of two sisters and physical abuse of brother proven by preponderance of the evi-
dence).
117 See, e.g., In re O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1982) (affirming judgment remov-
ing child found to be physically and sexually abused based on preponderance of the
evidence).
"8 See, e.g., Wright v. Arlington County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 388 S.E.2d 477 (Va.
Ct. App. 1990) (determining by a preponderance of the evidence that children were
sexually abused by mother and mother's boyfriend).
13 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d) (Deering 1988) (recognizing the
court's jurisdiction when a minor "has been... or there is a substantial risk that the
minor will be sexually abused"); id. § 355 (stating that the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard applies during the jurisdictional phase); id. § 361(b) (stating that a
child cannot be taken away from parents without clear and convincing evidence that
the child is in danger). Additionally, see In re Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 798 (Ct.
App. 1984) (ruling that preponderance is sufficient for jurisdictional phase but clear
and convincing evidence is required for placement of child with non-parent).
140 In re Joshua S., 252 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109 (Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that, al-
though the preponderance standard is appropriate in this case, different due proc-
ess interests are involved when a child is taken away from a parent); see also
Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (holding
that the use of preponderance standard to terminate parental rights was proper be-
cause the mother's use of dangerous drugs and resulting injury to her child was pre-
viously established by clear and convincing evidence); In re Jennifer V., 243 Cal.
Rptr. 441, 443 (Ct. App. 1988) ("A child may not be removed from physical custody
of a parent or guardian absent clear and convincing evidence of abuse or neglect.");
see also CAL. RULES OF COURT 1456d (Deering Supp. 1998) (requiring a finding by
clear and convincing evidence that a child is in danger before removal from parents).
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under a federal law addressing custody proceedings involving
Native American children, proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence is required in order to remove children from the care and
custody of a parent or custodian for any reason."'
3. The Countervailing Government Interest
The important governmental interest in protecting children
can still be realized by utilizing the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard in abuse proceedings. Some courts, however,
have reasoned that raising the burden of proof might jeopardize
the child's safety and result in increased fiscal and administra-
tive burdens.' 2 Use of the higher standard would not necessarily
cost more, however, and it would more accurately reflect stated
policy goals."3 Pursuant to family preservation ideology,'" states
should resist wresting custody from a parent unless the child's
safety or welfare is clearly endangered. 45 Significantly, Califor-
141 See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1994). Child custody proceedings for Native Ameri-
can Indian children require that "[n]o foster care placement may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing
evidence... that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custo-
dian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." Id. See
generally JUDGE EDWARD L. THOMPSON, PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN (1994)
(discussing the impact of child protective proceedings on Native American Indians).
"The interests of children in a wholesome environment has a constitutional dimen-
sion no less compelling than that the parents have in the preservation of family in-
tegrity. In the hierarchy of constitutionally protected values both interests rank as
fundamental, and must be shielded with equal vigor and solicitude." Id. at 27 (citing
In re Jerry L., 662 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Okla. 1983)).
141 See, e.g., Wright, 388 S.E.2d at 478-79; In re Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 1000
(Mass. 1990).
143 See COSTIN, supra note 2, at 119-122 (discussing family preservation models
to assert that the government should target and treat at-risk families, rather than
resort to foster care placement).
1" See 42 U.S.C. § 629(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The Act provides funding "[Mlor
the purpose of encouraging and enabling each State to develop and establish, or ex-
pand, and to operate a program of family preservation services and community-
based family support services." Id.
'45 See COSTIN, supra note 2, at 119. By 1993, 30 states had adopted a family
preservation program, Homebuilders, as a model program. See id. Troubled families
are identified and assigned a caseworker. See id. at 120. Although a pilot program
involved a caseworker assigned to "no more than two families" in order to provide
round-the-clock access and intensive family services, avoidance of more expensive
foster or institutional care resulted in "astonishing" cost savings. Id.; see also Peter
A. Lauricella, Chi Lascia La Via Vecchia Per La Nuova Sa Quel Che Perde E Non Sa
Quel Che Trova: The Italian-American Experience and Its Influence on the Judicial
Philosophies of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Joseph Bellacosa, and Judge Vito Ti-
tone, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1701, 1711 (1997) (asserting that Justice Scalia views "the
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nia utilizes bifurcated proceedings but courts impose the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence before removing a
child from a parent's custody.' The state is not compelled to
dismiss petitions that do not meet the higher standard; rather, it
may intervene in productive, less intrusive ways by authorizing
family counseling and monitoring services.""
New York courts have used similar reasoning to justify ap-
plying the clear and convincing standard in proceedings to sus-
pend parental visitation to children placed in foster care: "main-
tenance of the family unit is the preferred solution .... [Ilt is
not apparent that there is any countervailing interest on the
part of the... state which would be furthered by use of the 'pre-
ponderance' standard.. .. "" In In re Pablo,'4" a court consid-
ered the issue and determined that proof by clear and convincing
evidence was required.50 Like a custody determination, the deci-
preservation of the family unit as paramount"); Carole A. Smith, Family; Family
Preservation Services, 25 PAC. L. J. 701, 704-05 (1994) (examining state law which
encourages family preservation).
But see Melanie Togman Sloan, No More Baby Jessicas: Proposed Revisions to
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 12 YALE L. & POLY REV. 355, 381 (1994)
(criticizing the policy of family preservation and claiming that it "is not based on the
best interest of the child and more specifically on the child's social relationships").
1'4 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(b) (Deering 1988 & Supp. 1997); In re
Joshuia S., 205 Cal. App.3d 119, 125 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Questions concerning a more
stringent standard [than preponderance of the evidence] do not arise until a finding
of dependency results in a disposition which severs the parent-child relationship ei-
ther temporarily or permanently."); In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 617
(Ct. App. 1978) (stating that "clear and convincing proof is required only when the
final result is to sever the parent-child relationship and award custody to a nonpar-
ent").
147 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (Deering 1994) (defining minors subject
to the court's jurisdiction including those determined to be sexually abused or at
risk of sexual abuse). The statute expressly provides that services to families in
need of assistance may be offered regardless of whether there is an adjudication of
abuse or neglect. See id. Additionally, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.5
(Deering 1994) (containing a variety of legislative initiatives aimed at supporting
and preserving family unity).
14 In re Pablo C., 439 N.Y.S.2d 229, 233 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1980). See also
Resignato v. Resignato, 624 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (2d Dep't 1995) ("Denial of visitation
rights is a drastic remedy, and should only be done where there are compelling rea-
sons and substantial evidence that such visitation is detrimental to the child's wel-
fare."); Vasile v. Vasile, 498 N.Y.S.2d 635, 636 (4th Dep't 1986) (asserting the impor-
tance of visitation to the noncustodial parent).
149 439 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1980).
'50 See id. at 233. The court stated:
[An] assessment of the interests of the child, parent and State in a deter-
mination of the question of suspension of visitation and the use of a par-
ticular standard of proof leads to the conclusion that the appropriate stan-
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sion to suspend visitation is temporary and reversible;"' how-
ever, the court made a distinction, stating that suspension was
more serious, as it was "a step beyond removal."'52 The court
reasoned that a higher standard was warranted to serve "the
state's policy of returning children to their families whenever
possible [] based on the legislative determination that a normal
family life offers a child the best opportunity for development
and that his need for a normal family life will usually best be
met in the natural home."5 ' The court noted that the higher
"'evidentiary requirement operate[s] as a weighty caution upon
the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evi-
dence is loose, equivocal or contradictory.' ""5
Both suspension of custody and suspension of visitation
"set the stage" for a permanent termination of parental rights."
The same degree of caution should be exercised in custodial de-
terminations involving sexual abuse allegations where proof is
often entirely circumstantial and contradictory.' In order to ef-
dard in this type of proceeding is the equivalent of the "clear and convinc-
ing standard."
Id. The natural mother of two children placed in foster care objected to the foster
parents' petition to suspend her visitation privileges. See id. at 230. Although the
Supreme Court had not yet considered the due process issues later decided in San-
tosky v. Kramer, the New York trial court used a similar analysis in weighing the
interests of parent, child and the state in reaching its decision. See id. at 231-32.
' See W.M.E. v. E.J.E., 619 So.2d 707, 709 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (applying pre-
ponderance of evidence standard of proof in a proceeding to suspend visitation be-
cause such suspension is not permanent); In -re Marriage of Kingsbury, 917 P.2d
1055, 1058-60 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (asserting that the suspension of the father's visi-
tation rights could be reexamined when it would be in the daughter's best interest to
do so).
12 Pablo C., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (claiming that the degree of intrusion caused
by the suspension of visitation must be considered in determining the applicable
standard of proof); see also Acker v. Acker, 623 N.Y.S.2d 34, 34 (4th Dep't 1995) (ob-
serving that the denial of visitation is such a drastic remedy that substantial evi-
dence and compelling reasons must be presented as to why it would be in the child's
best interests to discontinue visitation).
'5' Pablo C., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 233 (stating that a permanent alternative to re-
uniting the family can be sought only when it is impossible for a normal family
home to be provided for the child by the parent).
'" Id. at 234 (quoting Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 385
N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (N.Y. 1978)).
' Id. at 233 (stating that breaking the custodial link by denying parents visita-
tion "sets the stage" for eventual termination of parental rights); see also Acker, 623
N.Y.S.2d at 34 (describing the denial of visitation as a drastic remedy).
' See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (observing that "[cihild
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute... because there
often are no witnesses except the victim"); see also Sopher, supra note 11, at 636
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fectuate stated policy goals, greater certainty is required before
family relationships are irreparably destroyed.
The type of evidence in sexual abuse cases varies and is of-
ten contradictory. The state may present evidence of physical
abuse which includes, for example, evidence indicating that a
young girl's hymen has been broken or that there is vaginal scar-
ring.'57 Fact-finding determinations may also be based, however,
on circumstantial evidence such as a psychologist's interpreta-
tion of a child's behavior. In the former case, there is likely
enough evidence of sexual abuse that the clear and convincing
standard would be met anyway.
Moreover, due process must be flexible. Dissenting in San-
tosky, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the adequacy of statutory
schemes "cannot be... determined merely by the application of
general principles unrelated to the peculiarities of the case at
hand."5 8 Custody proceedings that involve sexual abuse allega-
tions are peculiar because they subject accused parents to in-
comparable risks. Raising the standard would not necessarily
preclude less intrusive alternatives and would more effectively
serve public policy.
II. ANALOGIES TO OTHER CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
The preponderance standard requires that the risk of an er-
roneous determination be borne in roughly equal fashion by the
parties. Equitable risk sharing, however, is not always appro-
priate despite the civil nature of a proceeding. In Santosky, the
Court compared parental termination proceedings to civil com-
mitment,5 9 deportation, 60 and denaturalization, 6" which are all
(discussing evidentiary difficulties encountered in prosecuting and defending child
sexual abuse cases due to lack of physical evidence in most cases).
157 See, e.g., supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 775 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (asserting that "[t]he indi-
vidual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the
possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to
the state").
160 See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (recognizing the serious conse-
quences of deportation).
161 See Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (asserting that "in
view of the grave consequences to the citizen, naturalization decrees are not lightly
to be set aside"); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943) (recog-
nizing the importance of the right of citizenship, and that "such a right once con-
ferred should not be taken away without the clearest sort of justification and
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civil proceedings that require a higher standard of proof than
preponderance of the evidence."2
A. Civil Commitment
Determining what process is due under the Constitution in-
volves balancing the private interests of the parties and the
permanence of the threatened loss." Like the due process chal-
lenge to the civil commitment proceedings in Addington v.
Texas,"M child custody hearings are civil proceedings in which the
government is a party.' These proceedings involve fundamental
liberty interests, and "are all reversible official actions.""' The
similarity of these issues warrants comparison.
The Addington Court recognized the important function of
the standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings.'67 The
Court rejected the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, de-
termining that "the state [should not] be required to employ a
standard of proof that may completely undercut its efforts to fur-
ther the legitimate interests of both the state and the patient
that are served by civil commitments."" The Court, however,
found that the preponderance of the evidence standard, even
though typically used in civil cases, would be inappropriate in
civil commitment proceedings. 69 The Court noted that the lower
standard is appropriate in most civil cases because they involve
monetary disputes with which "society has a minimal concern
with the outcome."7 ' In contrast, the Court found that "the indi-
proof).
16a See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756. The Santosky court realized that certain civil
proceedings which threaten important liberty interests or result in stigma to the
individual deserve the greater certainty provided by the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard. See id. at 756.
16a See id. at 758; see also Gilbert v. Homer, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1813 (1997) (recog-
nizing that the Supreme Court, "in determining what process is due, [must take into
account] 'the length' and 'finality of the deprivation' ").
16 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
16 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
166 Id.
167 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-25 (asserting that "[t]he standard [of proofl
serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative
importance attached to the ultimate decision").
16 Id. at 430.
16 See id. at 423 (recognizing that the preponderance standard is well-suited for
civil proceeding because it affords the rights of the parties approximately equal
wei0ht).
Id. at 423 (contrasting the function of the Due Process Clause in civil and
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vidual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding
is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state
to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere
preponderance of the evidence.""'
Whereas in Addington, the state sought to exercise "author-
ity under its police power to protect the community from the
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill,"7 in a child
custody hearing, the state, as parens patriae, has a legitimate
interest in providing temporary removal of a child from a par-
ent's dangerous tendencies.' However, reliance on the civil na-
ture of a custody proceeding to justify the preponderance stan-
dard belies the gravity of its outcome.7 In contrast to civil
disputes concerning monetary compensation, society has a sub-
stantial interest in protecting parents from false allegations that
threaten family integrity. Use of a higher evidentiary standard
in sexual abuse custody proceedings would comport with Adding-
ton's logic that the state must use particular caution when exer-
cising power that serves one of society's interests but infringes
upon another.'75
The state must give greater deference to the rights of par-
ents who may be falsely accused before taking custody of their
children.'76 An individual in a civil commitment proceeding faces
a significant loss of liberty by involuntary commitment to a men-
criminal cases).
'.. Id. at 427 (expressing that equal risk sharing in this situation is inappropri-
ate because erroneous decisions pose a substantially greater threat to an individ-
ual's interest).
172 Id. at 426 (analyzing the detrimental effect of employing the preponderance
standard given the state's interest in the matter).
171 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
174 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) (rejecting the preponderance
standard in civil juvenile delinquency proceedings). The Court noted that "civil la-
bels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards in juvenile courts." Id.; see also In re Dianne P., 494 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884
(2d Dep't 1985) (acknowledging that the "potential impact" child custody proceed-
ings have on "family relationships evokes the need for limited constitutional protec-
tions").
175 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27 (noting the impact that burdens of proof
have on the factfinder).
176 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764-65 (1981) (quoting Addington,
441 U.S. at 427) (noting the importance of using a clear and convincing standard "in
a parental rights termination proceedings [because it] would alleviate 'the possible
risk that a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely on a few
isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyncratic behavior' ").
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tal hospital.177 Although a parent deprived of custody does not
face physical confinement, if the parent is identified as a child
molester, severe familial,"' social, 79 and economic constraints's
will be imposed.
The Addington Court noted that involuntary confinement is
not punitive. 81 Theoretically, temporary dispositions in child
protective proceedings are not punitive either.'82 The loss of cus-
tody and the stigma associated with sexual abuse allegations,
however, have the effect of punishing parents for their alleged
acts." Moreover, civil commitment and custody proceedings
may both result in "temporary" liberty deprivations' and can
"engender adverse social consequences to the individual."'8 The
Addington Court concluded that the preponderance standard
"falls short of meeting the demands of due process" for civil
commitments.'" Applying Addington's rationale to child custody
proceedings, the state should be compelled to prove allegations of
177 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (noting the potential loss of liberty in civil
commitments "requires due process protection").
178 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1052 (McKinney 1999). Dispositional alterna-
tives include: the child's placement in a foster home or state institution; issuance of
an order of protection or restriction; or prohibition of contact between parent and
child. See id.
179 See infra Part III (regarding the social stigma of sexual abuse findings); see
also STEIN, supra note 9, at 31 (discussing ambiguous statutes and the social harms
that they may confer on both parent and child).
'8 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745. The Court acknowledged that a natural par-
ent's interest in " the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children' is an interest far more precious than any property right." Id. at 758-59 (ci-
tation omitted).
181 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428 (distinguishing standards of proof in civil and
criminal proceedings and declining to equate civil commitment proceedings with ju-
venile delinquency proceedings).
182 See Sopher, supra note 11, at 638 n.38 (explaining that "[blecause the juve-
nile court's purpose is to implement nonpunitive, individualized justice for children,
the focus is on help and treatment, not punishment."); In re Diane P., 494 N.Y.S.2d
881, 885 (2d Dep't 1985) (noting that parents in child custody proceedings do not
face criminal penalties); In re Vance A., 432 N.Y.S.2d 137, 146 (Fain. Ct. New York
County 1980) (noting that civil child protection proceedings serve a remedial, as op-
posed to a punitive, purpose). But see STEIN, supra note 9, at 31 (discussing the ar-
gument that child neglect laws are unconstitutionally vague and attempt "to punish
parents for antisocial behavior").
18 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (noting that regardless of the label used, clas-
sifications that draw negative social attention "can have a very significant impact on
the individual").
14 Id. at 425-26.
18 Id. at 426 (referring to involuntary mental commitment).
' Id. at 431.
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a parent's sexual abuse by clear and convincing evidence.
B. Juvenile Delinquency
In In re Winship,1 87 the Supreme Court determined that a
finding of juvenile delinquency required proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The Court acknowledged that although crimi-
nal sanctions do not apply, the factfinder is nonetheless charged
with determining if the accused has committed a criminal act.'
The Court also addressed the stigma associated with a juvenile
delinquency determination.189 In spite of their civil nature, the
Supreme Court recognized the quasi-criminal nature of the pro-
ceedings and the social costs inherent in a finding of juvenile de-
linquency, and noted the following year that "[wihere a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him," a liberty interest might be
implicated.1" Five years later, the Court expressly required that,
in order to rise to constitutional magnitude, the stigma must also
result in a "tangible" loss.9 Thereafter, litigants who could meet
a two-part "stigma plus" test were allowed to bring claims re-
garding reputational damage in federal court."
187 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
18 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427-28 (discussing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970)).
"8 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. The Court stated that juvenile delinquency
proceedings implicated the "possibility that [the respondent] may lose his liberty
upon conviction and... the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the convic-
tion." Id.
190 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (holding that a state
sponsored "posting" statute attached a "badge of infamy" to the citizen, and result-
ingly implicated due process concerns). A year later, the Court decided Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court acknowledged that refusal to re-
employ a state employee might, under certain circumstances, implicate a liberty in-
terest. See id. at 573. In 1979, Congress enacted § 1983 of the public health and wel-
fare code, which created a federal cause of action when state action deprives an in-
dividual of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994).
191 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (stating that in order for a lib-
erty violation to occur, a state-protected right or status separate from the injury to
reputation must be altered or terminated). The plaintiffs name and photograph
were included in a police department flyer which was circulated to local merchants.
The flyer was entitled "active shoplifters." Id. at 695. At the time, the matter was
pending and the plaintiffs guilt or innocence had not been established. See id. at
696.
1 See id at 708-10. The Court explained that the stigma associated with de-
famatory allegations is "doubtless an important factor in evaluating the extent of
harm worked by that act, but we do not think that such defamation, standing alone,
SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CHILD CUSTODY
Like a minor charged with an act of juvenile delinquency, a
parent accused of sexual abuse in a child custody proceeding
does not face criminal sanctions; however, the court makes a fac-
tual determination as to whether a criminal act has been com-
mitted. 93 While presumptions of innocence do not apply in civil
sexual abuse fact-finding hearings,"M the proceedings do take on
quasi-criminal characteristics. 195  An examination of the New
York statutes regarding child protective proceedings demon-
strates the unique risks confronting parents.
Under New York State law, in order to sustain a petition
alleging the sexual abuse of a child, the court must identify the
specific section of penal law violated.'9 The family and criminal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction. 97 There are unique search
and seizure laws under the New York's Family Court Act which,
for example, allow forcible entries. 98 The respondent's initial
deprive[s the victim] of any 'liberty' protected by the procedural guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 709. The court distinguished prior cases in which
the " 'public opprobrium and scorn' " resulted from formalized government action
and" 'affirmative determinations.' " Id. at 707 n.4 (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 443 (1960)) (criticizing Justice Brennan's dissent). Justice Brennan argued
that the majority's foreclosure of constitutional safeguards amounted to a "regretta-
ble abdication" of the court's role in protecting against "arbitrary and capricious offi-
cial conduct." Id. at 734-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Stigma plus involves a two-prong test. See Tarkanian v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 741 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Nev. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 179
(1988). The first prong is satisfied by an injury to reputation. See id. Additionally,
the stigma must be so severe that the individual is precluded from pursuing oppor-
tunities in his chosen profession. See id.; see also Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans
Hos?, 537 F.2d 361, 366 n.13 (9thCir. 1976).
9; See In re Gina D., 645 A.2d 61, 65 (N.H. 1994) ("[An abuse proceeding under-
takes a solemn decision-making process as does a criminal trial on allegations of
sexual abuse.").
'9 See Barton L. Ingraham, The Right of Silence, the Presumption of Innocence,
the Burden of Proof, and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to O'Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 559, 572 (1996) (discussing the distinctions between civil and criminal
actions in terms of procedures, presumptions, and burdens of proof).
"" See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982) (stating that "the factfind-
ing stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding bears many of the indi-
cia of a criminal trial"). In criminal proceedings the potential for creating factual
errors that justified imposing a heightened standard of proof was found to similarly
exist in parental termination proceedings; therefore, imposing the clear and con-
vincing standard in termination proceedings had "both practical and symbolic con-
sequences." Id. at 764; see, e.g., infra notes 210-21 and accompanying text.
1 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 1051(e) (McKinney 1999).
197 See id. § 1014 (authorizing transfer to and from family court and concurrent
proceedings).
'08 See id. § 1034(2) (McKinney 1999). "The standard of proof and procedure for
such an authorization shall be the same as for a search warrant under the criminal
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appearance is much like an arraignment.'" Special evidentiary
rules afford the accused far less protection than they would re-
ceive in criminal trials.2" Parents who choose to testify on their
own behalf in family court do so at their peril-there is no statu-
tory protection against self-incrimination."' Furthermore, a
hearsay exception permits a child's out-of-court statements to be
used at the hearing, provided there is other admissible evidence
to corroborate the child's statements.2" In practice, a single
anonymous call to a child abuse hot-line or a paid "expert's" tes-
timony may satisfy the corroboration requirement.2"
Moreover, regardless of whether a charge is made in a civil
or criminal proceeding, an allegation of sexual abuse necessarily
places the parent and the state in adversarial positions. The
Santosky court recognized the gross disparity of the resources
available to each side.
The State's ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs
the parents' ability to mount a defense. No predetermined limits
restrict the sums an agency may spend in prosecuting a given
termination proceeding. The State's attorney usually will be
expert on the issues contested and the procedures employed at
the factfinding hearing, and enjoys full access to all public rec-
ords concerning the family. The State may call on experts in
family relations, psychology, and medicine to bolster its case.
Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing will be the
agency's own professional caseworkers whom the State has em-
procedure law." Id. Furthermore, in child protection proceedings, evidence seized
illegally is not subject to the exclusionary rule. See In re Dianne P., 494 N.Y.S.2d
881, 882 (2d Dep't 1985). The state's interest in protecting minors was found to far
outweigh the exclusionary rule's deterrent value. See id.
19 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1033-b (McKinney 1999) (listing the rights of a re-
spondent at the preliminary hearing).
200 See Lawrence J. Braunstein, Child Sex Abuse Allegations: Recognizing One's
Limits as a Practitioner, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 22, 1991, at 1 (discussing the application of
the exclusionary rule in child protective proceedings); see also Ingraham, supra note
194, at 572.
20 See Braunstein, supra note 200 (noting that clients that testify in child pro-
tective proceedings risk self-incrimination in criminal proceedings). See generally
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1014(c) (McKinney 1999) ("Nothing in this article shall be in-
terpreted to preclude concurrent proceedings in the family court and a criminal
court."). The family court judge has discretion, however, to grant "testimonial im-
munity in any subsequent criminal court proceeding." Id. § 1014(d).
'20 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vi) (McKinney 1999).
'20 See People v. Daniels, 339 N.E.2d 139, 140-41 (N.Y. 1975) (explaining that,
due to the overriding public policy considerations inherent in sexual abuse cases,
the New York Court of Appeals has relaxed the requirement for corroboration).
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powered both to investigate the family situation and to testify
against the parents. Indeed, because the child is already in
agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the his-
torical events that form the basis for the termination.'
It is readily apparent that, regardless of whether a pro-
ceeding results in a finding of juvenile delinquency, a permanent
termination of parental rights, or a temporary loss of custody,
the state retains an overwhelming advantage." Utilizing a
minimal standard in child abuse and neglect proceedings "places
a great deal of importance on an adequate, well prepared and
vigorously litigated defense. "2 1 In spite of statutory rights to
counsel afforded in some states, the parent of limited means is
placed at greater risk."0 7 As a result, the poor and minorities are
most vulnerable to erroneous custodial deprivation decisions.c
The intermediate standard of proof---clear and convincing
evidence-is warranted when more certainty is required "to pre-
serve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated
proceedings that threaten the individual involved with 'a signifi-
cant deprivation of liberty' or 'stigma.' "2oM Family courts have
214 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
2 See id. Greater procedural and evidentiary protections were traditionally
given to criminal defendants because they were said to need additional "protec-
tion.., against the massive forces and resources of the state." Ingraham, supra
note 194, at 574. However, this rationalization may be outdated because potential
sanctions are less severe today than under 18th century English common law. See
id. at 574-75.
206 Braunstein, supra note 200, at 4.
207 See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (holding
that indigent parents in termination proceedings are not automatically entitled to
court-appointed counsel; rather, the decision should be left to the discretion of the
trial court); see also Kevin W. Shaughnessy, Note, Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services: A New Interest Balancing Test for Indigent Civil Litigants, 32 CATH. U. L.
REV. 261, 285 (1982) (criticizing the Lassiter court's failure to establish an absolute
right to counsel).
208 See ALAN SuSSMAN & STEPHAN J. COHEN, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION 111 (1975) (offering several explanations
for the statistical finding that the number of reported child abuse cases dispropor-
tionately represent the poor and minority populations). To a certain degree, over-
representation of minorities in child custody proceedings may be due to bias in re-
porting because lower-income families are more visible to police and caseworkers.
See id.; see also COSTIN, supra note 2, at 149 (considering the correlation between
reports of child abuse and levels of poverty); Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua,
Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality and the Law, 2 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 157 (1995). The authors suggest "less dras-
tic.., dispositional alternatives, such as family supervision, home visits, or services
for children and families at risk as the result of inadequate resources." Id.
Santosky, 455 U.S,. at 756 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26
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not fairly considered parents' contentions that the stigma which
results from a finding of sexual abuse of a child adversely im-
pacts their rights, particularly considering the prominence of
child abuse registries.
In Lee TT. v. Dowling,21 ° the New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed a decision that determined that procedures associated
with the state's child abuse registry violated the rights of ac-
cused individuals.21" ' Although this case did not involve child pro-
tective proceedings, it implicates the stigmatizing effect of sexual
abuse allegations.
Lee T. consolidated two cases involving parties who were
the subjects of reports which resulted in the listing of their
names with the New York State Central Register of Child Abuse
and Maltreatment.212 One petitioner, a child psychologist, was
reported to have sexually abused his 16-year old stepdaughter. 3
The other petitioners were foster parents.24 A school psycholo-
gist filed a report suspecting abuse in response to their foster
daughter's "acting out" sexually.21 5  In both cases, the reports
were investigated, hearings held, and although the reports were
unsubstantiated, the registry refused their requests to expunge
the records because there was "some credible evidence" of the
allegations.1 6
(1979)).
10 664 N.E.2d 1243 (N.Y. 1996).
2' See id. at 1246 (holding that a report of sexual abuse must first be substanti-
ated by a fair preponderance of the evidence before any information concerning the
incident may be released to employers in child care agencies); see also Larry "R" v.
State of New York Dep't of Soc. Servs., 1997 WL 778338, *1 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't
Dec. 18, 1997); In re Kenneth "VV" v. Wing, 652 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (3d Dep't 1997);
In re Walter W. v. State of New York Dep't of Soc. Servs., 651 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (3d
Dep't 1997) (annulling and remitting for a review consistent with the appropriate
standard of proof, an employees request to have his name expunged from the Cen-
tral Registry).
212 See Lee TT., 664 N.E.2d at 1246 (explaining that the petitioners sought to
have their names expunged from the Central Registry).
213 See id. at 1248. Petitioner was the subject of a telephone hotline call to the
Central Register. See id. The Register sent the report to the local county Depart-
ment of Social Services, which investigated the allegation. See id.
214 See id. (noting that the petitioners had three foster children).
215 Id. The psychologist filed the report with the Central Register. See id.
216 Id. at 1248-49. The Department of Social Services requires an investigatory
finding that "some credible evidence of the alleged abuse or maltreatment" exist in
order to maintain a listing in the Central Register. N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 422(5)(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999). Further, the acts alleged were said to be "reasona-
bly related" to employment in the child care field. Lee 7T., 664 N.E.2d at 1249.
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On appeal, the Lee TT. court considered whether the state,
through its registry procedures, had deprived the parties of any
constitutionally protected right, and if so, what process was
due.21 7  The court applied the "stigma-plus" test.21 8  The first
prong, damage to reputation, must be supplemented by a show-
ing that the reputational injury caused by state action affected
some "tangible" interest.2 9 Because the listing was found to "se-
verely jeopardize" the psychologist's future employment oppor-
tunities, the court found there was a constitutionally protected
interest.220 The foster parents, now precluded from realizing the
tangible benefits of foster care contracts, were found to be simi-
larly damaged."'
Once the court determined that a liberty interest was impli-
cated, it applied the Mathews three-part balancing test, consid-
ering the rights and interests of the parties.2  The court found
that the "State and private interests [were both] weighty and
compelling." 3 Based on what the court characterized as a
"'bare minimum' of evidence,""4 the court concluded that, in or-
der to disseminate records to employers or state licensing agen-
cies, allegations would have to be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence at a fact-finding hearing.' Significantly, the court
217 See Lee TT., 664 N.E.2d at 1249.
218 Id. The two-prong test determines if the damage to reputation rises to the
level of a deprivation of a constitutional right. See id. at 1250.
219 Id. at 1249 (noting that "[the stigma which results from the publication of
such defamatory material is not constitutionally protected. A loss of liberty results
only if some more 'tangible' interest is affected or a legal right is altered").
21 Id. at 1250 (explaining that all future employers would have to consult the
list before hiring petitioner, and that if an employer decided to hire him, the em-
ployer would be required to state, in writing, his reasons for such a hire).
221 See id. (stating that the inclusion of the petitioners in the Central Register
affected their present employment and foreclosed future employment in the child
care area). The listing had resulted in all three of their foster children being re-
moved by the state. See id. The foster parents were also forced to abandon their
plans to adopt one of the children as a result of their inclusion in the registry. See
id.
222 See id. at 1250. The three-part balancing test was established by the Court as
a means of examining the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
223 Lee TT., 664 N.E.2d at 1251.
124 Id. at 1251 (referring to the statutory requirement that "some credible evi-
dence" exist in order to list reports in the Central Register). Some credible evidence
is defined as "evidence worthy of being believed." Id. (citing Department of Social
Services Child Protective Services Program Manual, app. B, at 7 (Aug. 1989)).
225 See Lee TT., 664 N.E.2d at 1252 (stating that "[t]he most practical method of
safeguarding subjects reported to the Central Register is to require a higher stan-
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acknowledged that "the stigma of being branded a child abuser
may extend well beyond employment in the child care field to
prevent employment in any field."22
III. UNFAIR RISK SHARING IN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
It has been argued that utilizing a higher standard of proof
might seriously jeopardize the child's welfare by placing her at
risk to remain or return to a home where she has suffered from
actual, though unproved abuse.227 This position properly consid-
ers the welfare of the child, but fails to recognize the harm that
children suffer from the unsettling effects of custodial interven-
tion.228 In light of the deviant nature of sex abuse allegations and
subjective determinations, well-intentioned judges and social
workers may unwittingly inflate the risk of erroneous removals.
A. The Political Correctness of Judicial Intervention
Four factors have been identified as influencing judicial de-
cision-making in child welfare proceedings:
[T]he perceived status quo at the time of custodial choice; a
heightened emphasis upon risks associated with... fewer liti-
gation resources; the fact that the litigation is understandably
and inevitably focused upon the possibility that the respondent
has caused harm to the child; and the judge's special vulner-
ability to negative feedback in the event of adverse conse-
quences from a failure to intervene.'
These factors cumulatively result in a "sequentiality effect"
dard of proof before reports are substantiated"). The Court further concluded that
there may be some cases in which it would not be appropriate to disclose reports,
even though the report could be clearly substantiated by a preponderance of the
evidence. See id.
226 Id. at 1250-51.
227 See In re Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 1000-01 (Mass. 1990).
226 See Davis & Barua, supra note 208, at 151 n.60 (stating that many judges
focus on the risks in the home and tend to overlook the significant risks that a child
may suffer as a result of placement in a state care program); see also Marsha Garri-
son, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75
GEO. L.J. 1745, 1753-54 (1987) (discussing the shortcomings of the traditional child
welfare system); Pat Litzelfner and Christopher G. Petr, Case Advocacy in Child
Welfare, 42 SOCIAL WORK 4, 322 (July 1, 1997) (stating that various studies
prompted public criticism that instead of protecting children, the child welfare sys-
tem was harming them).
229 Davis & Barua, supra note 208, at 143. The authors assert that it is more
desirable to consider custodial matters by excluding the risks to parents, and fo-
cusing solely on the best interests of the child. See id. at 145 n.35.
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that is described as the probability that "custodial decisions
made at one stage of... [the] proceeding[s] ... [will] influence
decisions at the next stage."30 Compounding this effect is a bias
which causes increasing resistance to custodial change over
time.231 Thus, once the child is removed from parental custody,
there is a strong tendency to maintain the status quo.'n Risks of
non-intervention are exaggerated in cases that involve poorer
parents pitted against the vast resources of the state.' As pub-
lic figures, judges must consider their accountability for errone-
ous determinations. "[Diecisionmakers have great reason to fear
that they will be made to regret a wrongful decision not to inter-
vene and little reason to fear that they will be made to regret a
wrongful decision to intervene."' Consequently, political and
community pressure may inadvertently result in judges skewing
decisions in favor of custodial intervention.'
By utilizing the preponderance standard, the risk of error is
exacerbated,3 6 particularly when facts are uniquely difficult to
prove--or disprove." Like the civil commitment proceedings at
230 Id. at 146.
See id. at 146.
2" See id. at 156 (stating that [w]hen a judge errs on the side of intervention,
that intervention becomes the status quo from which deviation will be difficult in
laterphases of the proceeding").
See id. at 152.
"Id.
235 See id. at 158 (noting that the decision-maker who opts against intervention
is more vulnerable to public reprisal); see also In re Christine H., 451 N.Y.S.2d 983,
987 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1982) (stating that "[uinless the judge takes no
chances and removes all children from all offending or possible offending parents,
some children will suffer further injury and even death after their cases are brought
to court") (citation omitted).
m See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970) (explaining that the prepon-
derance test is often misinterpreted by the trier of fact). Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is "a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual
error." Id. at 363.
23 See Scott M. Brennan, Due Process Comes Due: An Argument for the Clear
and Convincing Evidentiary Standard in Sentencing Hearings, 77 IOwA L. REv.
1803, 1809-10 (1992) (noting that the risk of error increases when the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard is applied to complex issues); see also U.S. v. Townley,
929 F.2d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[wie nonetheless observe the un-
usual nature of the sentencing determination in this case .... [u]nder such circum-
stances, due process conceivably could require more than a mere preponderance").
Conversely, the risk of error diminishes by utilizing the clear and convincing
evidence standard which "is no stranger to the civil law." Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S.
276, 285 (1966). This intermediate standard has been utilized in quasi-criminal pro-
ceedings where greater certainty is required. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 368 n.6
(Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing the applicability of a clear and convincing stan-
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issue in Addington, determinations in custody proceedings in-
volving allegations of sexual abuse are largely dependent on fac-
tual interpretation by psychiatrists and psychologists. Having
these professionals testify to the child's experience in the ab-
sence of physical evidence is potentially dangerous."5 The Ad-
dington Court rejected the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, surmising that the state could not meet its burden of
proof given the "lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric
diagnosis." 9 Consequently, the Court "turn[ed] to a middle
level.., of proof that strikes a fair balance between the rights of
the individual and the legitimate concerns of the state. . . .'clear
and convincing' evidence."2 °
The risks of error in child abuse proceedings are magnified
by the subjective nature of the determinations. 1 The Court in
Santosky acknowledged the danger of such subjectivity in the
judges' "unusual discretion to underweigh probative facts that
might favor the parent."242 This is particularly risky to the par-
ent accused of sexual abuse.243 Symptoms such as a sudden in-
terest in sexual acts, loss of appetite, or reversion to bedwetting
may be valid indicators that a child is being sexually abused.2"
dard in deportation proceedings); see also TMF Tool Co., v. Siebengartner, 899 F.2d
584, 588 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "t]he standard is high because of the fear
that claims of fraud can be manufactured easily") (citations omitted).
238 See infra notes 252-253 and accompanying text.
239 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). "Psychiatric diagno-
sis.., is to a large extent based on medical 'impressions' drawn from subjective
analysis and filtered through the experience of the diagnostician. This process often
makes it very difficult for the expert physician to offer definite conclusions about
any particular patient." Id. at 430.
Id. at 431.
241 See In re Christine H., 451 N.Y.S.2d 983, 987 (Fam. Ct. Queens County
1982). This risk of error is exaggerated by use of the preponderance standard be-
cause it calls on the factfinder to "perform an abstract weighing of evi-
dence... without regard to... convincing his mind of the truth of the propositions
asserted." Id. (quoting Dorsan & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile
Law, 1 FAM. L. QUARTERLY No. 4, at 26-27, cited in Winship, 397 U.S. at 368).
242 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982). Subjectivity becomes a particular problem when
sexual abuse is alleged, as vague symptoms may be subject to interpretations. See
COSTIN, supra note 2, at 17.
243 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 31 (discussing ambiguous child abuse statutes).
"[It has been argued that 'the judge, by virtue of parens patriae, has the freedom
and perhaps the responsibility to use his own subjective views. It is the judge's no-
tion of 'neglect' or 'depravity' that is most important." Id. (quoting SANFORD N.
KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY BREAKDOWN 59
(1971)).
24 See COSTIN, supra note 2, at 17 (citing possible indicators of child abuse ac-
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Under different circumstances, however, these same symptoms
might be attributed to childhood stress, divorce, or exposure to
age-inappropriate television programming.' 5
Judges face particular difficulty in assessing the validity of
evidence presented in child sexual abuse matters. 6 In In re Ja-
clyn p.,24' a family court found that a father had sexually abused
his two daughters, who were ages two and three at the time of
the alleged incidents. 8 At trial, the children's mother testified
that her older daughter had described repeated acts of sexual
abuse by their father.249 The father denied the allegations and
there was no physical evidence to support the claims.' ° Wit-
nesses for the father, including several medical doctors and men-
tal health professionals, also testified that there was no evidence
substantiating the allegations.2 ' The child's out of court state-
ments were corroborated by a certified social worker who had in-
terviewed the child and obtained detailed descriptions of abuse
using anatomically correct dolls.u2 The Family Court dismissed
the petition. The appellate court, citing In re Tammie Z., re-
versed, stating that "the evidence preponderated in favor of the
presentment agency." 3 The New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed, stating that there was adequate support for a finding of
sexual abuse.'
cording to a list prepared by The National Committee for the Prevention of Child
Abuse).
2"5 See id.; see also Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ra-
tio: Evaluating the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 58-63 (1997); Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and
Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 469-72 (1996).
24 Expert testimony espousing various syndromes further complicates judicial
evaluation. See Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations
of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, JUDGES'
JOURNAL, Fall 1997, at 38, 42. Among the theories believed to influence witness's
testimony are "Parental Alienation Syndrome,"and "Malicious Mother Syndrome."
Id. at 41.
247 658 N.E.2d 1042 (N.Y. 1995).
2 See id. at 1044 (Smith, J., dissenting) (providing factual and procedural
background).
2 9 See id. at 1043 (noting that the older daughter described abuse of both
daughters to the mother).
'o See id.
22 See id. The child's paternal grandmother testified that her granddaughter
never complained during her visits. See id. A psychologist and a family therapist
testified that the allegations of abuse were "unfounded." Id.
252 See id.
'6 Id. (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (McKinney 1999)).
24 See id. The court of appeals rejected the father's challenge to the social
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The sole dissenting judge strongly objected to the reliability
of the evidence.' The dissent questioned whether the expertise
of the social worker had been properly established. 5 The dis-
sent noted that there had been no evidence introduced to demon-
strate that the social worker had prior experience with sexually
abused children of similar age or specialized training in dealing
with situations where no physical evidence substantiated the
alleged sexual abuse.27 The dissenting judge questioned the so-
cial worker's techniques, noting the absence of testimony re-
garding whether they were accepted by the professional thera-
peutic community,2 particularly the controversial use of
"anatomically correct" dolls." 9 The dissent questioned the reli-
ability of using dolls with "pronounced genitalia"--their use
might influence a child's responses.2 °
A higher standard of proof will not jeopardize the welfare of
children when allegations of sexual abuse are supported by
physical evidence.26' When physical evidence is lacking, how-
worker's qualifications, finding that the objections were not properly raised at the
trial level. See id.
See id. at 1044 (Smith, J., dissenting).
250 See id. The appellate court evaluated the evidence and concluded that the
social worker's testimony was "highly reliable" and that the father's evidence was
"unpersuasive." Id. at 1043. On appeal, the dissent noted that the social worker was
unable to substantiate the abuse until, after the seventh or eight session, the child
told her that she had been sexually abused by her father. See id. at 1044.
2157 See id. (explaining that the family court found only that the social worker
was an expert in the general area of child sexual abuse).
See id. (indicating that some courts do not permit the use of the techniques
employed by the social worker in this case).
See id. The majority did not address the issue, although the father's expert
disputed the reliability of their use. See id. During cross examination the social
worker admitted that "only the genitals of the dolls used were life-like while the
other features of the body, such as nose, eyes and ears, were painted on the dolls,
and there were no fingers or toes." Id.
260 Id. Cf Smith & Coukos, supra note 246, at 41 (arguing against the use of
syndromes with questionable scientific validity to discredit the parent who reports
the abuse).
26' See, e.g., In re Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 812 (1984). The court found suf-
ficient evidence that the child had been abused by her father based on the following
evidence: 1) sexual play during therapy indicated that the child had had sexual con-
tact with a male; 2) expert testimony revealed that her conduct during therapy was
consistent with other molested children; 3) the child had injuries to her vaginal
area; 4) the child's injuries could not have occurred accidentally; 5) the injuries
could have been sustained on the days the child had visitation with her father; 6)
the child "recoiled" at the sound of her father's name; and 7) the father failed to of-
fer evidence that someone other than himself was responsible. Id. at 812; In re Ni-
cole V., 518 N.E.2d 914, 916-19 (N.Y. 1987) (finding expert testimony that the child
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ever, courts are too willing to err on the side of caution. 2 Con-
sidering the myriad of factors that perpetuate erroneous custo-
dial deprivations, a preponderance of the evidence-a standard
of proof rejected for civil commitment and juvenile delinquency
proceedings-in the words of Justice Blackmun, "does not reflect
properly" the relative severity of the outcomes.'
B. Child Abuse Registries
As Lee 7T. demonstrates, child abuse registries serve an im-
portant purpose2 but have detrimental and potentially devas-
tating social and economic consequences for the accused par-
ent.2' The decision cites Valmonte v. Bane,2  in which the
displayed behavior consistent with sexual abuse coupled with physical evidence
satisfied corroboration requirement).22 See, e.g., Mary D. v. Watt, 438 S.E.2d 521, 530 (W. Va. 1992) (denying father
unsupervised visitation despite acquittal on same sexual abuse offenses tried in a
criminal court). A single dissenting judge admonished the majority opinion and re-
marked on the hysteria surrounding sexual child abuse:
[SIexual abuse these days seems to arouse all the hysteria that was associ-
ated with witchcraft in yesteryear. In fact, it has even spawned a witch-
huntingesque cottage industry, to-wit badly trained, ideological rape
trauma experts, rape counselors, bachelor level pseudo-psychologists, so-
cial activists, and other assorted species of jacklegs. I am a firm believer
that the best interests of the child are paramount, but that does not
mean... [that a father], like an accused witch... cannot clear himself be-
yond any shadow of a doubt. Continuous yelling and screaming of an accu-
sation does not make that accusation any more true.
Id. (Neely, J., dissenting).
But see In re Gina D., 645 A.2d 61, 64 (N.H. 1994) (rejecting sufficiency of evi-
dence based on psychologist's identification of "victimization themes" interpreting
two-1ear old child's nightmares and drawings).See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
264 See SUSSMAN & COHEN, supra note 208, at 11 (proposing a model law of re-
porting child abuse and neglect). The authors argue that "[tlhe protection of chil-
dren is furthered by encouraging the reporting of cases of suspected child abuse and
neglect." Id
268 See COSTIN, supra note 2, at 35-37 (discussing controversy over false reports
made to child abuse registries).
Even when investigations are handled well, accused persons often find
themselves unable to shake off the stigma of being suspected of sexual
abuse, even when the case proves to be unfounded or is dismissed in
court .... The label of "child abuser" can have profound consequences,
among them job loss, family breakup, and social isolation.
Id. at 36.
268 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the procedures employed by the De-
partment of Social Services to remove names from the state's central register of
suspected child abusers violated due process since they contained an unacceptably
high risk of error).
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plaintiffs had asserted that seventy-five per cent of the chal-
lenged child registry reports were expunged for lack of even this
low level of proof."7 State agencies, however, are subjected to in-
creasing scrutiny regarding their failure to detect patterns of
abuse directed at a particular child or in a family." Expunge-
ment of unfounded records has compounded the problem because
it effectively erases historical accounts that might otherwise re-
veal abusive patterns.26 A study by a special New York Com-
mission charged with investigating the effectiveness of child
abuse investigations found that traditional social services ap-
proaches, particularly regarding allegations of sexual abuse,
were failing. 7° As a result, recent changes to New York State
law make it more difficult for unsubstantiated reports to be ex-
punged.2 71  The provisions provide a powerful incentive for in-
creasing social worker accountability. However, the laws' liberal
267 See Lee TT., 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1252 (N.Y. 1996) (citing Valmonte v. Bane, 18
F.3d 992, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1994); Governor's Memoranda, 1996 N.Y. Laws 1846
(statement of George Pataki, Governor) ("[Alpproximately 80% of the reports made
to the child abuse hotline are effectively erased from existence.").
26 See, e.g., SECRETS THAT CAN KILL: CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS IN NEW
YORK STATE, COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, Jan. 1996 at 13. When child abuse
results in a fatality, caseworkers are criticized for not intervening. See id. at 9. The
study showed that confidentiality of records and the expungment of unfounded re-
ports prevent caseworkers from assessing their alleged failings. See id. at 11.
"9 See id. at 7.
27o See id. at 2. The Commission reported that New York State received 128,111
reports of child abuse by parents or guardians in 1994. Of these, 12,593 included
allegations of sexual abuse. See id. at 19. During the course of its investigation, the
Commission ascertained that the confidentiality rules which resulted in expung-
ment of unfounded reports prevented case workers from detecting and preventing
incidents of repeated abuse and shielded case workers from accountability when se-
rious and sometimes fatal abuse occurred. See id. at 11.
271 In response to the Commission's findings, the state legislature enacted the
Elisa's Law Child Protective Services Reform Act of 1996. See 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 12
(McKinney). The law was named after six-year old Elisa Izquierdo, who died from
her parents' repeated beatings. See Governor's Memoranda, supra note 267, at 1845
(statement of George Pataki, Governor). The law includes revisions to social services
law, domestic relations law, the Family Court Act and the mental hygiene law, al-
lowing child protective services information to be shared with schools or health care
providers so that abusive families may be quickly identified and furnished with
abuse-preventive services. See id. at 1846; see, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 422(4)(A)
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999). Rather than expunge unfounded reports, the rec-
ords are sealed and not disseminated to the public. However, records may be shared
if the suspected abuser has been charged with an abuse-related crime, officially re-
ported by a state investigatory agency or judge, there has been prior disclosure by
the individual in a prior child abuse report, or the child named in the report has
died. See § 422-a(1)(a)-(d) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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disclosure rules, low evidentiary standard, and an increasing
number of false accusations further subject a falsely accused
parent to social stigma.
C. Opening Courtrooms to the Public
Compounding the stigma is a movement to open up family
court proceedings to the public and press, revising the tradi-
tional preference to close all such hearings to outsiders.272 For
example, pursuant to a change in New York judicial law that
went into effect on September 2, 1997, Family Court proceedings
are now presumptively open to the public and to the press.273
While opponents claim that the long-term negative effects to the
parties should outweigh the public's right to access to the courts,
proponents counter that public access plays a vital educational
role.274 Thus far, courts have demonstrated a willingness to pro-
tect the privacy of children, but are far less protective of the pri-
vacy interests of their parents.275
272 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1043 (McKinney 1999). Under the statute, hearings
have presumptively been closed but public access has been permitted at the judge's
discretion. See id. The stigma associated with a sexual abuse allegation warrants
procedural protections in light of trends towards opening the courtrooms. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967) ("The more comprehensive and effective the proce-
dures used to prevent public disclosures of the finding, the less the danger of
stigma..).
27 See N.Y. UNIFORM RULES FAM. CT. § 205.4(a) (McKinney 1997). The rule
states that "[tihe Family Court is open to the public. Members of the public, includ-
ing the news media, shall have access to all courtrooms, lobbies, public waiting ar-
eas and other common areas of the Family Court otherwise open to individuals
having business before the court." Id.
274 See In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (1st Dep't 1996) ("[Tihe underlying
tragedy, and the ensuing public debate, provided an appropriate opportunity to edu-
cate the public as to the 'essential ... role of the Family Court in the child protec-
tive process,' which, thereby, overrode any potential, long-term damage that would
result to the children."); see also David A. Schulz & Carolyn K. Foley, Child Protec-
tive Proceedings: Open to Public? N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13, 1996, at S2.
27' See, e.g., Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (reversing trial court decision which
permitted press access to trial). This case involved protective proceedings for Elisa
Izquierdo's five half siblings. The appellate court reversed and closed the proceed-
ings to the press, noting the privacy interests of the children. See id. at 626-29. The
trial court stated that the parents had "little privacy left to protect." Id. at 624. Ad-
ditionally, see In re Katherine B., 596 N.Y.S.2d 847, 852 (2d Dep't 1993) (reversing
trial court decision to open the courtroom based on the privacy interests of the child,
and finding that the right of media access under the First Amendment did not apply
to child protective proceedings). But see Schulz & Foley, supra note 274 (asserting
that these holdings conflict with the New York Court of Appeals' view that open
courtrooms play a positive role in child protective proceedings and do not comport
with Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the First Amendment).
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In the context of a civil proceeding, the preponderance of the
evidence standard contemplates that the parties before the court
share equal or near equal risks in the outcome. Parents whose
custodial rights are challenged because of allegations of sexual
abuse, however, face far greater risks than the typical civil liti-
gant. Political pressure on factfinders and the tendency for early
judicial determinations to influence later ones belie the tempo-
rary nature of the parent's loss. The stigma of child abuse alle-
gations, which may be unsubstantiated, significantly impact the
risks, particularly regarding the privacy interests of the accused
parent. The increasing influence of child abuse registries and a
movement towards opening child protective proceedings to the
public further exaggerate the inequality of risk.
CONCLUSION
Motivated by a desire to protect children from severe and
repeated abuse, our legal system seeks to serve the interests of
parent and child in a manner that is fundamentally fair. In San-
tosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court concluded that, in order to
protect the due process rights of parents facing termination of
parental rights, proof by clear and convincing evidence was re-
quired, particularly since this higher standard of proof would re-
duce the risk of erroneous decisions without unduly burdening
the state. Determinations made in custody proceedings that
may result in devastating blows to family integrity and to the
individual integrity of the accused likewise require greater cer-
tainty than a preponderance standard affords. The courts' con-
tinued reliance on child custody proceedings' civil nature inequi-
tably allocates the risk of error, to the considerable detriment of
both parent and child.
In an effort to protect children's rights, a climate of hysteria
threatens the lives and liberty of the falsely accused. In the in-
terest of fundamental fairness, the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, found to be defective in parental termination
proceedings, should likewise be abandoned in fact-finding hear-
ings involving a parent's potential loss of custody based on sex-
ual abuse allegations. Raising the standard of proof to clear and
convincing evidence would serve society's interest in preserving
family integrity, ensure that proceedings are fair to the accused
parent, and allow for resources to be reallocated towards family
monitoring and counseling. Thus, this higher standard would
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satisfy the state's compelling interest in protecting children and
serve public policy by preserving family integrity.
Colleen McMahon
200 39 CATHOLIC LAWYER, Nos. 2-3
